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The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary cor-
porations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Meta-
phors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to
liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it.'
UDGE Cardozo's observation is as accurate today as it was sixty years
J ago. The subsidiary corporation2 is still misunderstood. It is com-
monly observed that the subsidiary organization exists to limit liability
among affiliated corporations. This observation, however, is normatively
wrong because the subsidiary's role in limiting liability is economically
inefficient.' In a more positive vein, the subsidiary is more than a device
to limit liability; it is an extraordinarily powerful conflicts device in the
law of international business organizations. Indeed, this aspect of the
subsidiary is independent of its risk-shifting function.
The subsidiary structure operates as a conflicts device by minimizing
the number of forums in which a suit may be brought. A unitary firm
that has "minimum contacts"4 with several forums is usually subject to
jurisdiction in each of these forums. A firm may, however, conduct ac-
* Attorney, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. A.B., 1976, Brown University;
Ph.D., 1980, Columbia University; J.D., 1988, Yale University. The views expressed in
this Article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
or any component of the Federal Reserve System.
I would like to thank Thomas Baxter, Annette Crowley, Joyce Hansen, Peter Harrar,
John Kornfeld, Andrew Koppelman, Ernest Patrikis, Bradley Sabel, Elizabeth Sack-
steder and Rosa Testani for commenting on drafts of this Article.
1. Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
2. Here and throughout the paper, "subsidiary" refers to wholly owned subsidiaries.
3. The normative approach of this Article is almost exclusively economic.
4. In International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), the Supreme
Court adopted a standard for personal jurisdiction based on a party having "minimum
contacts" with a forum. See id. at 316; R. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions 4r
2.02[4][b], at 2-22 (1983); J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, Civil Procedure § 3.10, at
123 (1985).
In rejecting International Shoe's claim that it was not subject to personal jurisdiction in
Washington, the Court stated:
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940)). Due process is satisfied "by such contacts of the corporation with the.., forum
as make it reasonable... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there." Id at 317. Although this test is fuzzy over a broad border, a far larger
core of undisputed applications ensures that this doctrine is of immense practical utility.
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tivities in one of these jurisdictions through a subsidiary. If a suit against
the firm arises from the subsidiary's activities, the firm is only subject to
suit in this one jurisdiction, despite activities in other forums. The sub-
sidiary thus serves a purpose similar to the one served by the forum non
conveniens doctrine,5 but yields far more predictable results.6 The sub-
sidiary is predominantly a transactional conflicts device, which is very
different from the conflicts doctrines employed in litigation. When suc-
cessful, transactional conflicts devices disguise the transjurisdictional na-
ture of the transaction and break it down into a set of intrajurisdictional
transactions, each of which is clearly within the jurisdiction of only one
sovereign and can be adjudicated without recourse to the laws of other
sovereigns. The most visible transactional conflicts devices are contrac-
tual forum and law-selection clauses, which are designed to simplify the
judicial conflict-of-law task. Many other such devices exist.' Yet suc-
cessful transactional conflicts devices tend to be invisible to a legal com-
munity that gathers its core data from case law.'
The subsidiary's conflicts function has been obscured by its grant of
limited liability. These two functions are not decoupled in corporate law,
5. "[Ihe forum non conveniens doctrine ... permits a court having jurisdiction
over an action to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction when the litigation could be brought
more appropriately in another forum." J. Friedenthal, M. Kane & A. Miller, Civil Pro-
cedure § 2.17, at 88-89 (citations omitted). The word "appropriately" is what a judge
chooses to make of it, and there seems to be no such thing as a straightforward forum non
conveniens case. For example, a court's discretion to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds is usually considered to be conditioned on the existence of an alternative forum
having jurisdiction over all parties and having the ability to grant complete relief. See id.
at 89. But even this rule, which may be the closest forum non conveniens comes to
predictability, is not ironclad. See Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474,
482-85, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 602-03, 467 N.E.2d 245, 250-51 (1984).
6. See supra notes 4-5; infra notes 129-32, 175-76 and accompanying text.
7. See F. Scoles & P. Hay, Conflict of Laws 1076-1131 (Lawyer's Edition 1984).
8. To illustrate the invisibility of the subsidiary's conflicts aspects, consider the busi-
ness decision to coordinate planning with a supplier. There are three ways to do this:
relational contract, purchase of assets to form a unitary organization or purchase of stock
to form a subsidiary. All three methods accomplish the same economic goal, which is to
replace market with governance incentives. But they have very different legal conse-
quences, not only substantively, but jurisdictionally as well. See, e.g., Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980) (contractual ties alone do not convey jurisdiction); De Beers
Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220-22 (1945) (cannot establish anti-
trust jurisdiction through arm's-length contracting with parties over whom jurisdiction
exists). If De Beers had used marketing subsidiaries within the United States, it may well
have been subject to United States antitrust law. If it had a unitary organization, the
United States would certainly have had jurisdiction. Therefore, choice of organizational
form, like choice of domicile, is a transactional conflicts device.
As another example, the creation of a subsidiary is a potent tool in international tax
planning. See generally European Ass'n for Legal and Fiscal Studies, Branches and Sub-
sidiaries in the European Common Market: Legal and Tax Aspects 18-19 (2d ed. 1976)
("All the Member States of the Common Market have provided in their legislation for the
avoidance, to a greater or lesser extent, of double taxation in regard to profits transferred
from subsidiary to parent company.... ."). The subsidiary plays an analytically different
role in domestic tax planning. See infra note 55.
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but rather are conjoined in a portmanteau called "subsidiary." 9 Because
liability limitation and legal personality are tightly intermingled, business
people do not distinguish between lawsuits won due to limited liability
and those won because of lack of jurisdiction over the subsidiary. Fur-
thermore, the law of subsidiaries is remarkably contextual and doctrinal,
which discourages lawyers from attempting to understand the subsidiary.
This Article attempts to unbundle the package by discussing limitation
of liability and legal personality as two separate issues. Because legal
personality serves a significant conflicts function and because this Arti-
cle's analytic techniques (and normative criteria) are chiefly economic,
this inquiry involves an economic discussion of conflicts law. The argu-
ment is developed in five sections, each standing for a separate
proposition.
Section I argues that limited liability within the subsidiary organiza-
tion cannot be justified using price theory. The analysis is almost exclu-
sively economic and responds to a considerable body of literature.
Section II demonstrates that limited liability and the subsidiary concept
are distinct doctrines that can be conceptually separated, and are actually
separated in the banking industry. The banking industry chooses not to
use subsidiaries in circumstances in which other industries employ the
device. (When the banking industry does use subsidiaries, they are
rather different from those used by industrial corporations). Instead, the
banking industry utilizes legal devices that apparently confer legal per-
sonality on the subsidiary without conferring limited liability on the par-
ent. As a result, the distinction between the conflicts and limited liability
roles of the subsidiary becomes manifest.
Having set the stage for a discussion of the subsidiary's conflicts role in
Section II, I embark on a lengthy digression: Section III sketches an
economic theory of conflicts. Any reader who is willing to believe that
forum shopping is inefficient may skip this section, although it develops a
general analytic framework that extends beyond forum shopping. Sec-
tion IV, the continuation of Section II, demonstrates that the subsidiary
is a useful conflicts device. The subsidiary's separate legal personality
reduces the costs of forum shopping and helps eliminate inferior adjudi-
cators from consideration.
The first four sections pose a puzzle: limited liability appears ineffi-
cient while juridical separateness appears beneficial. But the subsidiary
doctrine, as applied by the courts, exalts limited liability and belittles
juridical separateness. Assuming that corporate law is generally "effi-
cient," Section V attempts to explain why limited liability has not gone
the way of ultra vires 10 and other obsolete corporate doctrines.
9. They are decoupled only in the obscure "separate entity" doctrine of banking law.
See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
10. See W. Cary & M. Eisenberg, Corporations 77 (6th ed. abridged 1988).
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I. THE ECONOMICS OF LIMITED LIABILITY
This section demonstrates that the risk-shifting provided by subsidiary
limited liability is usually not beneficial. Limited subsidiary liability is
not, therefore, justifiable as a general rule of corporate law.
A. Limited Liability As Risk-Shifting
1. Limited Liability and Shareholders
Limited liability is certainly justifiable at the shareholder level, if not at
the subsidiary level. The conventional microeconomic explanation for
limited liability lies in the enterprise's ability to shift risk to its credi-
tors.11 The enterprise bears full risk up to a threshold amount, but shifts
any additional risk to creditors. Limited liability is therefore an insur-
ance policy against insolvency that the firm's creditors provide to the
firm's shareholders. This risk shifting is clearly efficient if the creditors
are better insurers than both the shareholders and specialized insurance
providers. Creditors are superior insurers in three circumstances: if they
are better able to assess or to protect against the risk of insolvency than
the shareholders or specialized insurers, if creditors are more risk ac-
cepting than the shareholders or if creditors are better able to reduce the
cost of bankruptcy."
Creditors 3 are frequently better able to assess default risk than share-
holders, especially when shareholders are passive investors in publicly
held corporations and creditors are sophisticated institutions, such as
11. My approach to this problem owes a great deal to a lively debate that occurred in
the late 1970s. See generally Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, An Economic Analysis of
Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. Toronto L.J. 117 passim (1980) (same);
Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy,
42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 589, 617-28 (1975) (discussing liability of individual shareholders);
Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 Del. J. Corp. L. 351
passim (1979) (same); Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 499, 501-05 (1976) (hereinafter "Posner I") (same). The debate, which
largely concerned the liability of individual rather that corporate shareholders, was set-
tled by an excellent article by Halpern et al. That article did not address the problem of
subsidiaries, although it did contain most of the machinery needed to work this problem.
See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra, atpassim. Subsequent articles have discussed
the subsidiary's limited liability problem. See generally R. Posner, The Economic Analy-
sis of Law 379-82 (3d ed. 1986) (hereinafter "Posner I"); Easterbrook and Fischel, Lim-
ited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89, 117 (1985); Roe, Corporate
Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1986); Schwartz, Products Liability,
Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relation-
ship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689 passim (1985).
12. See Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull, supra note 11, at 138-45.
13. It is important to note that "creditors" is a heterogeneous concept. Many credi-
tors, such as employees and small suppliers, are poor insurers. The worst insurers are
involuntary creditors-tort victims. Even some of the better creditors might be poor
insurers in a particular situation. For example, bank loan syndications are an acknowl-
edgment by the syndicate members that they cannot efficiently insure alone. Neverthe-
less, many creditors are better insurers than shareholders and limited shareholder liability
is not always an inefficient outcome.
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commercial banks or institutional investors. In such cases, creditors are
at least as good as outside insurers. Creditors are often more risk-ac-
cepting than shareholders, especially when shareholders are private indi-
viduals who wish to avoid risking their entire wealth on a single venture.
In public corporations, creditor liability is better than shareholder liabil-
ity in reducing the costs of bankruptcy because it is ex ante cheaper for
creditors to swallow their losses than to pursue a large number of
shareholders.
A more sophisticated and powerful explanation of shareholder limited
liability concentrates on capital market imperfections. Unlimited liabil-
ity requires that shareholders possess a great amount of information
about each other because the value of their shares is affected by their
fellow shareholders' creditworthiness. Under unlimited liability, wealth-
ier shareholders, possessing deeper pockets, will raise the value of all
other shareholders' stock. Conversely, poorer shareholders will depress
the value of other shareholders' stock. If shareholders cannot monitor
each others' wealth, adverse selection may result, leading to ownership of
shares primarily by the judgment-proof. Limited liability thus makes in-
formationally imperfect public securities markets possible."' Of course,
if shareholders have some way of monitoring each others' wealth, unlim-
ited liability might be workable. Lloyd's of London provides such an
example. 1
2. Limited Liability and Subsidiaries
These price-theoretic explanations provide strong support for limited
liability on behalf of diffuse individual shareholders and some support for
limited liability on behalf of close corporations. Price-theoretic explana-
tions do not, however, explain limited liability for sole corporate
shareholders.
Risk-shifting arguments are possible but weak. The subsidiary need
not be used to compartmentalize the risk of wealthy individuals because
a set of separately owned corporations suffices. While it is true that trade
creditors might suffer a smaller percentage loss of wealth than parent
corporations in the event of subsidiary insolvency, this argument should
be counterbalanced by the greater monitoring, contracting and moral
hazard costs of the subsidiary structure. Finally, public shareholders (al-
ready enjoying limited liability) are ex hypothesis the most risk-accepting
stakeholders of the firm, because they receive the residual share. 6
14. Commentators were at least intuitively aware of this in 1929: "The corporate
device has lent itself peculiarly well to the public marketing of securities .. " Douglas
& Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale LJ. 193,
193 (1929).
15. Lloyd's is a loose association of underwriters. It insures risk by asking wealthy
individuals to invest their assets in a particular insurance pool. The system works only
because Lloyd's underwriters can select the investors, thus reducing adverse selection
problems.
16. See infra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
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Monitoring arguments are implausible. Certainly, the parent company
is best situated to assess the risk of subsidiary default: it possesses far
better information than trade or financial creditors. Because no public
market in wholly owned subsidiary shares exists, the role of unlimited
liability in facilitating securities markets is irrelevant.1 7 Special govern-
ance arguments favoring limited liability may be adduced in some cases,
but they scarcely seem general enough to justify the prevalence of the
subsidiary form."
3. Limited Subsidiary Liability Creates Costs in Contract
Not only does the subsidiary form bear few microeconomic advan-
tages, but it is also more costly in some ways than unitary organizations.
Subsidiaries are less creditworthy than unitary organizations because
there is no guarantee that an individual subsidiary will be run with profit-
maximizing intent. The management of the parent firm might choose to
strip the subsidiary of its productive assets, absorb them into other parts
of the enterprise and leave the subsidiary's creditors to foot the bill upon
the subsidiary's bankruptcy.' 9 This sort of opportunistic behavior is not
easy to control legally because it is difficult to distinguish asset-stripping
from the type of asset redeployment that occurs even in non-opportunis-
tically managed subsidiaries. Because sophisticated creditors are aware
of this risk, they will take steps to make opportunism less profitable by
factoring these costs into any unguaranteed credit they extend to
subsidiaries.20
17. Note that these arguments hinge on the single ownership of the subsidiary. Multi-
ple ownership decreases the owners's incentives to gather information, increases cross-
monitoring costs, and decreases the owners' ability to control the corporation. But ef
Salomon v. Salomon & Co., 1897 App. Cas. 22, 44-45, 1895-9 All E.R. 33 ("How does it
concern the creditor whether the capital of the company is owned by seven persons in
equal shares, with the right to an equal share of the profits, or whether it is almost en-
tirely owned by one person, who practically takes the whole of the profits?"). The
problems involved in monitoring public corporations were present and known in 1776.
See A. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 700 (E.
Cannan ed. 1937).
18. The bank holding company is exemplary. See infra notes 57-59 and accompany-
ing text. Nonrecourse lending, which confers limited liability without the subsidiary, is
not unknown, although such lending is usually collateralized. For a particularly sophisti-
cated use of limited liability to reduce sovereign risk, see R. Brealey & S. Myers, Princi-
ples of Corporate Finance 751 (2d ed. 1984).
19. This is true for all types of limited liability. See Fischel, The Economics of Lender
Liability, 99 Yale L.J. 131, 134 & n.l1 (1989). The subsidiary merely exacerbates this
problem by permitting a single firm to create multiple opportunities for opportunistic
behavior. Reverse asset stripping is also possible. A faltering enterprise may attempt to
create a preference in bankruptcy by pushing assets into subsidiaries with favored credi-
tors. This behavior will also be thwarted by unitary liability. Such behavior was well
known in 1932. "One of the advantages of this financial secrecy [afforded by consolidated
accounts] lies in the opportunities which it gives to directors to manipulate the contrac-
tual and financial relations between the subsidiary companies and the holding company."
J. Bonbright & G. Means, The Holding Company 35 (1932).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 26-27. If these steps are successful, subsidiar-
ies may well seem to be operating as non-opportunistic separate profit centers. See Pos-
[Vol. 59
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Another problem with opportunism lies in the very nature of the debt
contract. A great advantage of using debt rather than equity financing is
that debt financing entails far lower monitoring costs. Because equi-
tyholders receive the residual share of a firm's profits, debtholders can
rely, to a large extent, on the equityholders' self-centered rationality: in
order to make a profit, equityholders must pay debtholders. Therefore,
debtholders know that equityholders must operate the firm to maximize
profit. Debtholders, then, merely have to ensure that the firm is not run
in too risky a fashion,2 and must safeguard against fraud. I do not argue
that the decision to extend credit is easy; I simply contend that monitor-
ing an ordinary debt contract, once credit is extended, is fairly
straightforward.
The subsidiary corporation, however, is one of the rare business enti-
ties that may display altruistic behavior. It is not in business to make
money for itself, but rather it exists to generate profits for its parent or its
parent's shareholders. This possibility of altruism, or opportunism,
makes monitoring the subsidiary more risky (or more expensive) than
monitoring a similarly-sized unitary firm.
It is important to distinguish misrepresentation from opportunism. A
firm may wish to use the subsidiary to misrepresent its creditworthiness
for the purposes of obtaining a loan. Opportunism refers to post-loan
behavior (moral hazard) while misrepresentation refers to the debtor's
pre-loan condition (adverse selection). Although the subsidiary fosters
opportunism, it both increases and decreases the prospects for misrepre-
sentation. The subsidiary's ability to increase misrepresentation is obvi-
ous: affiliates have incentives to make creditors believe that they are part
of a unitary structure. It is possible, however, for the subsidiary to de-
crease misrepresentation.
As Posner points out, creditors may be better able to evaluate the
creditworthiness of specialized subsidiaries, rather than the creditworthi-
ness of large unitary enterprises.' These creditors may have specialized
credit-rating skills, or may simply be unable to appropriate the gain from
rating a large enterprise when they only have to deal with a small subset
of the enterprise. Posner's point is analytically correct, although it tends
to underestimate the flexibility of market behavior. There are economies
of scale in evaluating the creditworthiness of larger unitary enterprises
that many creditors cannot capture. The factoring and debt-rating busi-
nesses exist largely to counter this scale problem. More significantly, the
beneficiaries of improved subsidiary monitoring are likely to be short-
ner II, supra note 11, at 381-82. The transaction costs of this virtuous behavior, however,
are higher than they need be because parties need to transact around the potentially op-
portunistic vehicle of the subsidiary.
21. See generally Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior.
Agency Costs, and Capital Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976) (effects of high leverage
on risk preferences of equity holders).
22. See Posner II, supra note 11, at 382.
19901
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term creditors, who must worry more about misrepresentation than op-
portunism. Such creditors are ex hypothesis unwilling to inquire into the
financial structure of the other affiliated corporations.
Long-term creditors, however, who have the most to fear from oppor-
tunism, generally transact around limited subsidiary liability by forcing
debtors to use de facto unitary organization. 23 Loan agreements typi-
cally refer to borrowers and their subsidiaries and lump the debt of these
organizations together for calculating indebtedness restrictions.24 Only
under special circumstances are subsidiaries restricted from the scope of
the covenant, particularly when the excluded subsidiary is in the finance
business. 25 Therefore, any short-term creditor who wishes to use its spe-
cialized skills (or save work) in monitoring a compartmentalized subset
of the business will find limited liability of only limited aid, because it
must reckon with the de facto decompartmentalization of liability that
long-term creditors may have created.
In this connection, the bank holding company subsidiary is notewor-
thy. Regulators desire to monitor closely the health of bank subsidiaries
within the holding company structure, which may include unregulated
nonbanking subsidiaries. Monitoring is done by bank examinations, a
task that is analogous to one performed by short-term creditors when
they monitor an ordinary subsidiary. Unlike such short-term creditors,
however, bank examiners have two backups: one entails examination of
the bank holding company while a second method, more significant in
this context, is statutory regulation. Bank holding companies are ex-
tremely restricted in the sort of interaffiliate credit that they may legally
extend. Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act permit banks
to give their holding company affiliates only loans fully secured against
good collateral, while permitting them to transfer assets only at fair mar-
ket prices.26 Sections 23A and 23B protect bank subsidiary creditors in a
way that the nonbanking law governing subsidiaries simply cannot.
As illustrated, the interests of short-term creditors in avoiding misrep-
resentation through monitoring irreconcilably conflict with the interests
of a subsidiary's long-term creditors, who seek to avoid opportunism by
extending unsecured credit within the subunits of the holding company.
Because long-term creditors are usually more powerful and sophisticated
than short-term creditors, they will often win, leaving short-term credi-
tors a de facto unitary structure without their knowledge. A single credi-
tor cannot reverse this problem contractually, although a creditor may
demand better terms in a partial effort to transact around limited liabil-
23. Opportunism of the sort described above is not possible for a unitary organiza-
tion, which must be run as a profit center to be run rationally.
24. See Simpson, The Drafting of Loan Agreements: A Borrower's Viewpoint, 28 Bus.
Law. 1161, 1165-71, 1187-88, 1190 (1973).
25. See id. at 1168. The finance industry, especially banking, is characterized by
unique rules. See infra notes 26, 57-59 and accompanying text.
26. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c - 371c-1 (1988).
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ity. Banking regulators, who represent the interests of short-term bank
depositors, protect them through Sections 23A and 23B and the source-
of-strength doctrine, described below in Section I-B. The subsidiary
structure is rational only under these very special conditions.
A corporation, then, probably obtains cheaper credit if it does not have
intersubsidiary limited liability,2 or if it guarantees its subsidiary's
debts.28 The two alternatives are functionally identical unless the parent
organization faces bankruptcy. Either alternative is superior to limited
subsidiary liability.
Despite the credit disadvantages, most industries use the subsidiary
form. An entity may wish to employ the subsidiary form for several rea-
sons: to obtain tax benefits, to reduce tort liability or to benefit from the
subsidiary's conflicts advantages. The banking industry, however, is suf-
ficiently constrained by credit considerations to avoid using subsidiar-
ies.29 Bank deposits are generally considered low-risk investments and
banks have every incentive to keep them so. Their low risk means that
risk-averse depositors (creditors) do not demand a large risk premium,
which keeps the cost of a bank's liabilities low. An efficient contract,
therefore, shifts as much bank risk as possible onto the bank's stockhold-
ers and as little risk as possible onto the depositors.3 0
27. See eg., Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 343, 356-57
(1947) (subsidiary at disadvantage because it must subordinate its finances to its par-
ent's); Landers, supra note 11, at 593 (low capitalization of subsidiary places cost of busi-
ness "on the creditors of the corporation and, through them, on the public as a whole.").
28. This approach is taken in German law. Aktiengesetz of 1965 §§ 302-03, 322
(translated in II Groups of Companies in European Laws: Legal and Economic Analyses
on Multinational Enterprises 272-73, 284 (K. Hopt ed. 1982)). As far as I know, only
German law permits such automatic veil-piercing. It would be interesting to compare the
German and Anglo-American historical experience, especially because the common law
efficiency hypothesis has been adduced for subsidiary limited liability. See Easterbrook
and Fischel, supra note 11, at 89.
29. See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, Eurodollars, Multinational Banks, and National
Laws, 64 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 733, 741 (1989).
30. See Black, Miller & Posner, An Approach to the Regulation of Bank Holding Com-
panies, 51 J. Bus. 379, 390-92 (1978). Indeed, at one time the need for depositor protec-
tion was seen as so compelling that bank shareholders were held doubly liable in the
event of bank default. See Federal Reserve Act § 23, 38 Stat. 273 (1913) (formerly codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. § 63 (1945)), repealed Pub. L. No. 86-230, § 7, 73 Stat. 457 (1959).
There is still some support for reviving this rule. See G. Benston, R. Eisenbeis, P. Hor-
vitz, E. Kane & G. Kaufman, Perspectives on Safe & Sound Banking 242-43 (1986).
There are other reasons why limited liability may be less attractive to banks than to
other businesses. For example, opportunistic inter-affiliate behavior is far easier for banks
than most other organizations because bank assets are more liquid than the assets of most
other business organizations. The inter-affiliate transfer of bank assets is regulated by
Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act. See 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1 (1988).
In addition, a bank's unitary structure enhances portfolio diversification. The general
advantages of diversification are discussed by Black, Miller and Posner in their discussion
of bank holding companies. Because bank holding companies are remarkably similar to
unitary banking enterprises on the liability side of their balance sheet, the argument ap-
plies more strongly to large unitary organizations. See Black, Miller & Posner, supra, at
392-94; infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. Finally, banks' tort exposure to per-
sonal injury, if not lender liability, is smaller than that of most industries.
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4. Limited Subsidiary Liability Generates Costs in Tort
Although limited liability increases the cost of credit to a subsidiary's
shareholders, parties can generally transact around the subsidiary if the
problems are sufficiently troubling. Even if they cannot alter the perverse
incentives of subsidiary limited liability, they may at least exact a price
for these incentives. The subsidiary is even worse in the case of torts.
Torts may be viewed as involuntary contracts that are not explicitly ne-
gotiated between tortfeasor and victim because the negotiation costs are
too high." Viewed this way, tort compensation is a sort of expost nego-
tiation with the victim that internalizes the cost of risk to the most effi-
cient risk avoider. This ex post negotiation is possible only if a tortfeasor
is solvent or insured. Limited liability permits corporations to foil this
process and externalize risk by segmenting themselves into small and rel-
atively judgment-proof subsidiaries. Although corporations benefit from
this aspect of subsidiary organization, society as a whole loses. All bene-
fits to corporations are offset by resulting detriment to victims, and haz-
ardous activities are insufficiently deterred.
As Easterbrook and Fischel have pointed out, corporations have in-
centives to insure against tort liability despite limited liability to share-
holders.3 2 Bankruptcy is costly and shareholders may be willing to
purchase some liability insurance to lower the probability of bankruptcy.
This reasoning, however, works only for unitary organizations. The
bankruptcy costs of a subsidiary are uniquely low. The chief bankruptcy
loss that Easterbrook and Fischel adduce is a loss of managerial human
capital specificity. 3 Such a loss is likely to be minimal if a subsidiary
becomes bankrupt because subsidiary management can generally move
back to the parent corporation with ease. Because specific physical capi-
tal can also flow back to the parent, although perhaps at going-concern
rather than liquidation prices, subsidiary bankruptcy costs are extraordi-
narily low to the parent company. 4
Assuming that use of a subsidiary reduces a parent's costs, though at
society's expense, why would any firm wish to purchase tort liability in-
surance instead of compartmentalizing risk into subsidiaries? One partial
explanation may be that firms can compartmentalize only so far. Any
court will pierce the corporate veil if each bolt in a factory is separately
incorporated." If the plant site has specific assets and must legally be
31. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1094-95 (1972).
32. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 107-09 (1985); see also Schwartz,
supra note 11, at 711-14 (1985) (developing "Limited Liability Risk Avoidance Model").
Schwartz's model does not discuss the possibility of consciously compartmentalizing lia-
bility through strategic use of subsidiaries, but rather it takes firm size as a given.
33. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 11, at 107-08.
34. Indeed, relationships with creditors, as opposed to victims, need not be substan-
tially disrupted.
35. Courts might not pierce the veil, however, if every pair of taxis in a fleet was
separately incorporated. See Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418-20, 223 N.E.2d
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treated as a unit, insurance, even of the plant subsidiary, is possibly desir-
able. The plant subsidiary, however, is not as well insured as the whole
corporation, which has more assets available to tort creditors and more
specific assets that demand insurance.
One argument remains for limited subsidiary liability in tort. Abolish-
ing the subsidiary will not eliminate the desire to externalize risk, and
other available means may be used. A company with deep pockets does
not need to establish a separate subsidiary to commit its torts because it
can hire a judgment-proof "independent" firm to do so. 36 This arrange-
ment might be more costly than a similar arrangement performed with
subsidiaries. Although the social costs of limited liability are preserved
upon moving to independent contractors, the private costs of transacting
around limited liability are added.
This argument, while superficially plausible, encounters some difficulty
upon closer scrutiny. If the private costs of using independent contrac-
tors exceed the private benefits of using them to commit torts, this
method of externalizing risk becomes unattractive and abolishing subsid-
iary limited liability reduces inefficient activity levels. Therefore, when
coordination costs 37 are extremely high, abolishing limited liability
works. When coordination costs are extremely low, abolishing limited
liability does little harm because risk externalization through independ-
ent contracting creates few additional social costs. Abolishing the sub-
sidiary is costly in tort only in the case of intermediate coordination
costs.
The cases in which coordination costs are substantial but not over-
whelming lend themselves relatively well to traditional agency analysis. 3
The agency criterion for such situations is relatively simple: was the con-
tract made chiefly to shift tort liability to the judgment-proof? (Alterna-
tively, could the defendant adduce any convincing reason for not doing
the work in-house?) This analysis is functionally similar to respondeat
superior.39
It is difficult, then, to justify the subsidiary's limitation of affiliate lia-
bility in straightforward microeconomic terms. Using a subsidiary raises
transaction costs in contract and externalizes risk in tort. In fairness to
6, 7-10, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 588-91 (1966). The court's refusal to pierce the veil is incor-
rect even though the defendant corporation was not a subsidiary, but rather was owned
by an individual. This individual ownership obviates governance arguments and the well-
developed market for automobile liability insurance obviates risk-aversion arguments.
36. This objection may be phrased in an alternative fashion. A genuinely free-stand-
ing company of a certain size is better able to externalize its tort costs than an otherwise
identical subsidiary if the subsidiary does not enjoy limited liability.
37. Coordination costs refer to the costs of using independent contractors minus the
costs of using an integrated company while holding liability consequences constant.
38. Agency law is a form of veil-piercing. See Brilmayer & Paisley, Personal Jurisdic-
tion and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and Agency, 74 Calif. L
Rev. 1, 15-19 (1986).
39. See Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale LJ. 1231, 1259-63(1984).
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the subsidiary, drawing conclusions from simple economic theory is
risky. Similar arguments have demonstrated that the security interest
should not exist.4 But if lack of microeconomic evidence is not proba-
tive of limited liability's inefficiency, such evidence is nonetheless
suggestive.
B. Veil-Piercing and Equitable Subordination
The limited liability granted by the subsidiary is not absolute and some
legal doctrines, such as "piercing the corporate veil," ignore the subsidi-
ary form. The corporate veil can be pierced in tort, contract and bank-
ruptcy.41 All three have a straightforward microeconomic justification as
rational introductions of liability when limited liability is assumed.
These economic justifications, however, are difficult to reconcile with the
case law. The actual case-law criteria for piercing the veil generally dis-
regard the economic criteria.42
This Article's economic analysis encourages routinely piercing the cor-
porate veil in contract unless perhaps the parties have agreed to respect
the veil.43 The case law, however, does not routinely pierce the veil in
contract. Rather, courts pierce the veil in contract when the subsidiary
form misled a creditor into entering an agreement. This exception is ra-
tional if one accepts limited liability in the first place. If a subsidiary
misrepresents itself as the parent organization, creditors will deal with
the subsidiary as if it were backed by the full faith and credit of the par-
40. Even though the security interest is routinely used to shift risks among creditors,
the security interest has no simple plausible explanation as a rational risk-shifting device.
See Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories,
10 J. Legal Stud. 1, 17-21 (1981); Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 901, 925-33 (1986).
41. Cf Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to its Creditors, 90 Harv. L. Rev.
505, 543-45 (1977) (linking the doctrines of corporate separateness, equitable subordina-
tion and fraudulent conveyances).
42. The leading New York case is still Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 247
A.D. 144, 156-58, 287 N.Y.S. 62, 75-76 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E.2d 56
(1936). In Lowendahl, the court refused to pierce the corporate veil and did not hold the
corporation's individual shareholders personally liable. The Lowendahi criteria for veil-
piercing are complete domination of the subsidiary by the parent and use of this domina-
tion to commit fraud or wrong that proximately caused injury to the plaintiff. See
Lowendahl, 247 A.D.2d at 157, 287 N.Y.S. at 76. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim
for failing to demonstrate that the shareholders exercised such total control over the
corporation when the cause of action arose. See Lowendahl, 247 A.D.2d at 158-62, 287
N.Y.S. at 76-81. A mere breach of contract on the part of the subsidiary, even with the
knowledge of the parent, does not satisfy the Lowendahl test.
43. This follows from the analysis in Section I-A. It is feasible, however, to formulate
another argument. A general rule of liability forces the subsidiary to reveal its status if it
wants contractually created limited liability. Any rule that increases the information
available in a transaction (if it does not decrease the incentives to create such informa-
tion) is ceteris paribus desirable.
One might argue, however, that a contract to respect the veil shall be deemed unen-
forceable, as it is difficult to understand how such a contract could be rational in the




ent organization. The subsidiary will thus get the favorable credit terms
of a unitary organization, while preserving its liability advantages. Pierc-
ing the corporate veil in this case serves precisely the same function as
misrepresentation remedies do in contract law.
In contrast, the economic justification for veil-piercing in tort can best
be attributed to the "frolic and detour" doctrine of vicarious employer
liability, in which no liability is placed on the parent if the parent's moni-
toring costs are too high. Most employee activity is not considered a
frolic and thus triggers vicarious employer liability. Yet most subsidiary
actions escape corporate veil-piercing even when the subsidiary seems to
have been created expressly to avoid liability.' The question remains
why the employer is held to a far higher standard than the corporate
parent.
Even though economic analysis indicates that the corporate veil is
senseless in tort, tort is not a per se ground for disregarding corporate
separateness. 45 Generally, courts will respect the corporate veil if the
subsidiary acts independently of the parent, but will attribute the subsidi-
ary's acts to the parent if the subsidiary does not display sufficient separa-
tion from the parent.' In addition, courts pierce the corporate veil when
the doctrine "would work fraud or injustice" or where the corporate
form is "interposed to defeat legislative policies."'47 It is difficult to de-
scribe the law of veil-piercing with any more precision, and it has been
aptly called "jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet.... The metaphors
are no more than conclusory terms, affording little understanding of the
44. See, e.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1960) (evi-
dence insufficient to establish that parent corporation acted as subsidiary's alter ego even
though subsidiary was undercapitalized); Walkovszky v. Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 420-21,
276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 589, 223 N.E.2d 6, 8-9 (1966) (refusing to pierce corporate veil be-
cause plaintiff failed to allege that owners used each subsidiary to conduct personal activi-
ties while obtaining limited liability). But see Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal.2d 576, 578, 15
Cal. Rptr. 641, 643, 364 P.2d 473, 475 (1961) (minority rule that undercapitalization
alone sufficient to merit veil-piercing).
45. See generally Annotation, Liability of Corporation for Torts of Subsidiary, 7
A.L.R.3d 1343, 1349 (1966) (parent corporation must exercise degree of control beyond
that normally present in parent-subsidiary relationship for court to pierce veil).
46. This separation is usually predicated on the degree of control a parent exercises
over a subsidiary. See, e.g., Sisco-Hamilton Co. v. Lennon, 240 F.2d 68, 69 (7th Cir.
1957) (allowing suit against parent for subsidiary's actions where such actions under par-
ent's control); Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267
(2d Cir. 1929) (subsidiary becomes parent's agent where they share common officers who
direct both companies); Lowendahl v. Baltimore & Ohio RR., 247 A.D. 144, 157, 287
N.Y.S. 62, 76, aff'd, 272 N.Y. 360, 6 N.E. 56 (1936) (parent's control over subsidiary key
factor in deciding whether to pierce corporate veil).
47. First Natl City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611,
629-30 (1983). Federal courts are beginning to embrace policies that favor veil-piercing.
See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (parent can
be liable under CERCLA if parent completely owns subsidiary, exercises concomitant
general authority and is actually involved in subsidiary's activities); Note, Piercing the
Corporate VeiL The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal Common Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev.
853, 853 (1982) ("Federal common law should look to federal statutory authority rather
than to state corporation law when deciding whether to pierce corporate veil.").
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considerations and policies underlying the court's action and little help in
predicting results in future cases."' 4  In all, the law of veil-piercing is
chaotic. It is based on the wrong supposition and often yields unpredict-
able results.
Not only are courts too restrictive in piercing the corporate veil, they
frequently use standards that make little economic sense. For instance,
courts in some jurisdictions seem solicitous of the subsidiary's capitaliza-
tion.49 Although a thinly capitalized subsidiary is more likely to be a
vehicle for fraud, tort or opportunism than a well-capitalized subsidiary,
it seems curiously ineffective to use a proxy inquiry when a more genuine
fraud, tort or opportunism inquiry could easily be made.
Like veil-piercing, equitable subordination is a rational doctrine if lim-
ited liability is assumed. 0 Both veil-piercing and equitable subordination
are designed to minimize the corporation's incentives to use subsidiaries
to defeat contract or tort claims. Under this doctrine, the parent's claim
to the subsidiary's assets in bankruptcy is subordinated to those of
outside creditors.5' Together with the law of fraudulent conveyances, 52
this doctrine makes it more difficult for a parent to gut a subsidiary in
order to expropriate wealth from creditors. Similar in theory to equita-
ble subordination are cases in which the subsidiary's creditors extended
credit on the assumption that the subsidiary will operate as a profit maxi-
mizing entity separate and apart from the parent.53 The doctrines of eq-
48. P. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: Procedural Law 8 (1983). Profes-
sor Blumberg and I agree on the disease, but differ on the cure. Professor Blumberg
advocates contextual inquiries that account for business realities. Cf Bulova Watch Co.
v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (exemplary case within this
genre). I am more partial towards per se rules grounded in economic analysis. I do not
know if these two distinct approaches yield similar results when applied.
49. See, e.g., Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676, 681 (4th Cir.)
(given small capital base as compared to parent and their similar management structure,
strong presumption that subsidiary and parent should be treated as one organization in
deciding whether to pierce veil), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 644 (1920); Minton v. Cavaney, 56
Cal.2d 576, 578, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643, 364 P.2d 473, 475 (1961) (subsidiary's under-
capitalization valid reason to pierce corporate veil). The Minton court pierced the veil
solely because the subsidiary was undercapitalized. See Minton, 56 Cal.2d at 578, 15 Cal.
Rptr. at 643, 364 P.2d at 475. This is virtually tantamount to per se disregard of corpo-
rate separateness because plaintiffs will not need to reach the parent of an adequately
capitalized subsidiary except for jurisdictional purposes.
50. See R. Clark, Corporate Law 52-71 (1985).
51. The leading case is Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939)
("Deep Rock"). In Taylor, a corporate parent sued to recover loans it had made to its
subsidiary (Deep Rock Oil Corp.) before the subsidiary declared chapter 11 bankruptcy.
See Taylor, 306 U.S. at 309-11. The court rejected the parent's claim. See id. at 323-24.
Instead, the court ignored the subsidiary's corporate form because the parent exercised
total control over the subsidiary and compelled it to enter into transactions that benefit-
ted the parent but harmed the subsidiary. See id. at 320.
52. Cf 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988) (Bankruptcy Act defines fraudulent conveyance as
when debtor transfers an "obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
entity to which the debtor was or became ... indebted").
53. See American Protein Corp. v. A.B Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 852 (1988). This case is cited for its fact pattern, not its pro-defendant result.
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uitable subordination and fraudulent conveyances, however, proceed in
the same Rube Goldberg fashion as the doctrine of veil-piercing. Start-
ing with the incorrect presupposition that limited subsidiary liability
should be the norm, the law creates unpredictable counter-doctrines
designed to undo the damage wrought by limited subsidiary liability.
C. Summary of the Economic Argument
Banks and other businesses use limited shareholder liability because
shareholders are less capable of assuming or assessing risk than other
creditors, and public securities markets depend on limited liability. As a
result, banks are less prone than other businesses to limit affiliate liabil-
ity. 4 Bank creditors (depositors) tend to be more risk-averse than gen-
eral business trade and financial creditors.
It is difficult to explain why limited subsidiary liability is the general
rule, especially when limited affiliate liability usually increases the ex
ante costs of credit. The standard reasons for stockholder limited liabil-
ity, including lower creditor risk aversion, creditors' superior ability to
monitor the business and informational advantages accruing from lim-
ited liability, generally do not apply to limited affiliate liability. Domes-
tic tax considerations partially explain the current subsidiary form," as
do tort insulation and the prevalence of corporate acquisitions.56
Such alternative explanations for maintaining the subsidiary organiza-
tion are not reassuring to an observer biased towards the hypothesis that
most business behavior maximizes social welfare. The corporate acquisi-
tions explanation is predatory unless one believes that bondholders in
acquired organizations had voluntarily negotiated their bond indentures
so that their investment value declines in case of a takeover. It is almost
54. See supra text accompanying note 29. Subsidiary bank structures usually exist
only as a response to anti-branching legislation, such as the McFadden Act. See 12
U.S.C. § 36 (1988).
55. Analytically, international taxation is very different from domestic taxation, be-
cause domestic (federal or intrastate) taxation does not involve conflicting jurisdictions
and the problems of multiple or zero taxation. At this point, I refer only to domestic
taxation.
56. Many subsidiaries were once independent firms. Assuming that as independent
firms, their trade and financial creditors had not requested special protection, the acquir-
ing firm has no reason to shift risks from the acquired firm's creditors to itself. I shall not
analyze whether independent firms' creditors should have included such protection when
they extended credit.
Acquisitions pose an interesting problem for tort creditors. The acquired firm presum-
ably committed torts in a privately efficient fashion. As a consequence, it had committed
torts at a higher rate than a firm with deeper pockets would have perpetrated. As dis-
cussed above, this is justifiable if no organized insurance market for these torts exist. See
supra notes 11-15, 31-39 and accompanying text. Without limited liability, then, the ac-
quired firm will commit fewer torts in the future. Should the acquiring firm be held
responsible for the excess pre-acquisition torts? In other words, should courts pierce the
veil if the old torts bankrupt the newly acquired subsidiary? Again, I shall not analyze
this issue of successor liability.
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impossible to assess the social welfare consequences of subsidiary organi-
zation for the purpose of domestic tax law.
Then why subsidiaries? Subsidiaries do provide insulation from tort
liability, although this insulation is probably not welfare-enhancing. A
better justification for the subsidiary can be found by examining the spe-
cial banking law of limited affiliate liability. The banking industry, with
its different credit requirements, illuminates the subsidiary doctrine.
II. SPECIAL FORMS OF AFFILIATION IN BANKING
Two legal doctrines attest to the special liability needs of banks. The
first, the source-of-strength doctrine, can be understood as a rational al-
location of insolvency risk between the firm and its creditors. In this
respect, the source-of-strength doctrine is an analogue of the subsidiary
doctrine applicable to the financial services industry. The second, the
separate entity doctrine, is explicable as a pure conflicts rule without ad-
ventitious risk-shifting components.
A. The Source-of-Strength Doctrine
The source-of-strength doctrine governs the liability of subsidiaries
within bank holding companies." This doctrine treats the affiliates of
bank holding companies as pseudo-subsidiaries in which affiliate liability
is only partially limited. In these organizations, the central holding com-
pany is responsible for maintaining the strength of each of the banking
subsidiaries. This ultimately means that strong banks and nonbanks
within the subsidiary structure are liable for the weaknesses of the con-
stituent subsidiary banks. Neither the parent nor the subsidiaries, how-
ever, is liable for failures in the nonbanking subsidiaries. The source-of-
strength doctrine thus creates a unidirectional subsidiary organization,
with the parent responsible for banking but not nonbanking affiliates.
The source-of-strength doctrine is easy to rationalize in terms of re-
ceived price theory.58 Consider a multidivisional company engaged in
57. See Board of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 252-53 (1978);
12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1990); 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (1987). This doctrine has been con-
siderably vitiated by MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852, 860-62 (5th
Cir. 1990), and may no longer possess significant legal force. In MCorp, the court held
that the powers conferred upon the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors by the Bank
Holding Company Act did not include the power to compel a parent to transfer assets to
its troubled subsidiary after the parent declared bankruptcy. See id. at 862. In addition,
the court held that the Board's power to restrict unsafe and unsound banking practices
did not include the ability to mandate such a transfer. See id. at 863.
The source-of-strength doctrine was originally articulated by the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem. It is therefore important to reiterate that my views, on the source-of-strength doc-
trine as well as other issues, do not necessarily represent those of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or any of the
other components of the Federal Reserve System.
58. A different justification for the source-of-strength doctrine is proposed in Fischel,
Rosenfield & Stillman, The Regulation of Banks and Bank Holding Companies, 73 Va. L.
Rev. 301, 336-38 (1987). That article argues that the source-of-strength doctrine is
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several industries, including banking. This company wishes to maximize
its total return on capital, which will entail shifting capital within divi-
sions as the performance of the divisions dictates. The company may see
a high investment return outside the banking division, which then re-
quires taking capital from the bank and lowering the bank's capitaliza-
tion to a point that might concern creditors (or regulators). Shifting
assets to more highly valued uses is systemically efficient, but it entails
higher risk to the banking subsidiary. The source-of-strength doctrine
permits the conglomerate to perform this capital reallocation but re-
quires that the capital of the conglomerate as a whole remain available to
the bank. Thus, the bank's safety remains unchanged from what it
would have been with a higher capital ratio but no source-of-strength
doctrine, while the conglomerate as a whole is more profitable than it
would have been if it were not able to perform the capital reallocation. 9
B. The Separate Entity Doctrine
The separate entity doctrine holds that bank branches are not obli-
gated to fulfill the legal obligations of other branches unless one of these
branches wrongfully refuses to perform." "Wrongful" refusal is predi-
cated on the law of the obligated branch. The separate entity doctrine
does not exist in general corporate law and is applicable only to banks.
This seemingly odd doctrine is best viewed as a form of the subsidiary
doctrine that does not provide limited liability.
Although it may appear odd, an unlimited-liability subsidiary has a
real function. The subsidiary is a portmanteau that not only limits liabil-
ity but also establishes a separate legal personality that has consequences
beyond risk shifting. Consider Rush v. Savchuk,6" which involved a lia-
bility insurance policy. 2 The plaintiff sued defendant Rush in Minne-
sota state court, asserting jurisdiction on the grounds that the
defendant's insurance company did business in Minnesota, even though
Indiana was Rush's domicile and the location of the accident. The
Supreme Court ruled that the Minnesota court did not have jurisdiction
because the personality of the insurance company could not be attributed
to the defendant, even though the insurance policy assured that Rush
designed to keep companies free of leverage. If this assumption is correct, its conclusion
that the source-of-strength doctrine is senseless is also correct.
59. Something resembling the source-of-strength doctrine might generally be useful in
parent-subsidiary relations. Debt guarantees permit creditors (or, in the case of banks,
regulators) to monitor closely the creditworthiness of an individual subsidiary closely,
while permitting the firm a good degree of interdivisional financial flexibility. Such guar-
antees become far more complex in the case of system-wide insolvency, in contrast to the
insolvency of only a constituent unit of the system. Complicated questions of the priori-
ties of debtors of healthy and unhealthy subunits emerge. German bankruptcy law might
shed some light on this subject. See supra note 28.
60. See J. Sommer, The Separate Entity Doctrine 2 (on file at Fordham Law Review).
61. 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
62. See id at 322.
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was, in many ways, a nominal defendant.63 Legal personality, therefore,
helps reduce the number of forums in which an entity is subject to
jurisdiction.
The subsidiary is thus a dual-function device. It not only limits liabil-
ity, but it also establishes legal personality" and is thus a key tool in
transactional conflict of laws. Banks cannot afford to conjoin limited lia-
bility with separate legal personality but can still benefit from separate
legal personality for their branches.6" The separate entity doctrine is best
understood as a means of conferring legal personality without limited
liability.
The previous section has argued that limited liability does not enhance
welfare. What about the subsidiary's other function of conferring per-
sonality? Are the conflicts consequences of legal personality welfare-en-
hancing? If so, the subsidiary can be salvaged as an efficient device. The
next two sections shall explore whether the subsidiary is a welfare-en-
hancing conflicts device.
III. TOWARDS AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CONFLICTS
This section attempts to demonstrate that forum shopping is generally
inefficient. (In the course of doing so, it also sketches the outlines of an
economic theory of conflicts.) The next section builds on this section
(but may be read independently) and discusses the merits of the subsidi-
ary as a prophylactic against forum shopping. Forum shopping is possi-
ble only if multiple forums have jurisdiction to hear a case, if they have
different substantive laws, and if their choice-of-law rules yield different
results.66 Although all of these conditions are required for successful fo-
63. See id. at 330.
64. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705-06 (1988) (uphold-
ing Cannon in dictum); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984)
(consistent with Cannon); Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 335
(1925) (subsidiary establishes jurisdictional legal personality).
65. This legal personality is provided through an ill-understood amalgam of several
doctrines: the "Act of State" doctrine, conflict of laws, sovereign immunity and the sepa-
rate entity doctrine. See generally Heininger, Liability of U.S. Banks for Deposits Placed
in Their Foreign Branches, 11 Law & Pol. in Int'l Bus. 903, 907-08 (1979) (discussing
limitations on general rule that home office bank liable for deposits in foreign branches);
Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 742 (whether a foreign bank branch is
treated as a separate legal personality depends on questions of "attachment of funds,
enforcement of a subpoena, and implementation of the tax or securities laws").
66. Professor Korn expressed these criteria more carefully:
The problem of forum-shopping arises when four conditions exist. First, the...
law governing judicial jurisdiction allows the courts of more than one state to
act in a single case. Second, the federal law governing legislative jurisdiction
allows application of the law of any of two or more states .... Third, under the
choice-of-law doctrine of the states having judicial jurisdiction, the courts...
could reach different conclusions as to which of the conflicting local rules
should be applied. Fourth, the probable conclusion of one or more of the per-
missible forums ... is predictable at the time that the plaintiff commences suit.
Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 772, 782-83 (1983).
Professor Korn's definition can apply to defendants' forum shopping as well as plain-
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rum shopping, I shall concentrate only on jurisdiction, neglecting choice-
of-law rules and assuming different substantive laws.'
Because conflicts law tries to solve the problem of divergent substan-
tive laws, such laws must be taken as an exogenous fixed variable in a
conflicts discussion. I neglect choice of law only for practical reasons.
The subsidiary doctrine, although it has some implications for choice-of-
law analysis, is generally considered a jurisdictional device. More gener-
ally, jurisdictional doctrines are far more effective than choice-of-law
principles in resolving conflicts. American choice-of-law analysis is noto-
riously manipulable.68 Jurisdictional principles, based generally on a
"minimum contacts" or "fair play" due process test, are better able to
cabin judicial discretion than are choice-of-law principles.69 Further-
tiffs' forum shopping. Consider Stewart Org. Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2239, 2249
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that forum-shopping would be en-
couraged if diversity cases used the federal rule respecting contractual choice-of-forum
agreements, rather than the local state rule disregarding such agreements. This fact pat-
tern is perfectly compatible with Professor Korn's characterization of forum-shopping.
Forum shopping by defendants is analytically very different from forum shopping by
plaintiffs. It presupposes sovereigns of unequal power, because otherwise there would be
no compulsion on the court of the plaintiff's choice to divest jurisdiction. I shall not
further discuss it in this article.
67. Although this discussion is weighted heavily towards jurisdiction, many of the
arguments are equally applicable to choice of law.
68. This is even recognized by the Supreme Court. See Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981). Section 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
gives judges a choice of seven normative criteria in making a conflicts determination. "It
is not suggested that this list of factors is exclusive." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws § 6 comment c (1969). This list includes the following factors:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests
of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
See id. at § 6(2). Given these flexible criteria, any competent judge could find the law of
any forum applicable to any case. Fortunately, much of the Restatement reduces the
malleability of Section 6. Nevertheless, choice of law is still a notoriously murky inquiry.
69. Compare Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1969) (addressing choice-
of-law principles) with Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 27-55 (1969) (dis-
cussing jurisdictional principles over individuals); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States §§ 402-21 (1986) (same). See Shreve, Interest Analy-
sis as Constitutional Law, 48 Ohio St. L.J 51, 57 (1987) ("The incidental effect of due
process restrictions on territorial jurisdiction can be significant in checking choice-of-law
abuses. The particular reach of these restrictions... should be considered in order to
determine whether... [a] doctrine directly addressing choice of law is even necessary.").
The rules ofjurisdiction, although more determinate than choice-of-law rules, are also
somewhat subject to manipulation. See Provident Nat'l Bank v. California Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 819 F.2d 434, 436 (3d Cir. 1987) (a banking case, finding Pennsylvania court
could assert general jurisdiction over California thrift that "maintained no Pennsylvania
office, employees, agents, mailing address, or telephone number. It had not applied to do
business in Pennsylvania, did no advertising in Pennsylvania, and paid no taxes there").
The only ironclad choice-of-law doctrine of which I know, the "internal affairs doc-
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more, to the extent that they are governed by constitutional standards,
jurisdictional principles are promulgated by one body, the United States
Supreme Court. Standardized conflicts rules minimize the opportunities
for forum shopping. In contrast to the Supreme Court's long involve-
ment with jurisdictional rules, the Court has only recently begun to regu-
late state choice-of-law rules.70
This section first discusses some general, economically expressible
goals for a conflicts regime. Once these goals are postulated, this Article
establishes that contract and tort must receive very different treatment,
and that these goals differ depending on the institutional regime7' in
which conflicts laws are embedded. The final subsection is a detailed
discussion of the economics of forum shopping. This Article's restricted
normative perspective implies that my analysis will not respond to most
of the literature in the field.72 My theory does not have to embrace fields
of law, such as family or criminal, which have significant noneconomic
(or even non-consequentialist) goals.
A. Goals
This Article posits three basic goals for commercial conflicts doctrine:
existence, uniqueness and optimality.73 These goals are general and can
trine" of corporate law, has been constitutionalized, possibly to set it apart from its more
malleable cousins and have it more closely resemble the conflicts law with teeth-juris-
diction. See McDermott, Inc. v. Lewis, 531 A.2d 206, 216-17 (Del. 1987); see also Bux-
baum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporate
Law, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 29, 34-35 (1987) (federal courts in danger of constitutionalizing
internal affairs doctrine).
70. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821-22 (1985) (state may
not use jurisdiction as argument when considering issue of choice of substantive law);
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307-13 (1981) (state must have sufficient interest
in litigation to apply its substantive law); see also Korn, supra note 66, at 786 (to deter-
mine legitimate exercise of jurisdiction, Supreme Court focuses on sufficiency of state
interest).
71. For a discussion of institutional regimes, see infra notes 93-99 and accompanying
text.
72. There have been very few economic analyses of conflicts law. Baxter's "compara-
tive impairment" principle is the only other detailed economic analysis of which I am
aware and he takes an approach that is quite different from mine. See generally Baxter,
Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 18 (1963) (court should con-
sider which state's objective will be least damaged by subordination). Richard Posner
sketched an approach to the economics of conflicts that resembles mine, but as far as I
know, he has never developed it. See R. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform
304-07 (1985).
73. For a discussion of these three goals, see infra notes 76-81 and accompanying
text. These goals pertain to conflicts rules, not to conflicts decisions. Almost all conflicts
decisions will eventually choose a unique adjudicator and law; a decision, by its very
nature, picks one alternative from many. The trick is to formulate a set of rules that will
provide a predictable, unique and appropriate adjudicator and law from the facts of the
case. Professor Dane makes the interesting point that the very notion of rules as autono-
mous from the decisions that create these rules implies something akin to a uniqueness




apply to even noncommercial fields. Because these goals are economi-
cally articulable, the weight given them is simpler in commercial law. It
is important to emphasize that these goals are arbitrary. They are eco-
nomically cognizable but are not efficiency goals, and they are justifiable
only through the appropriateness of the economic analysis based on
them.74
The most basic conflicts goal is existence: an applicable law and forum
should exist. Conflicts rules should ensure that some forum accepts ju-
risdiction over a private dispute." It is factually difficult but logically
possible to imagine a conflicts regime that does not provide a forum for
litigation between two parties.7 6 Existence of an appropriate forum may
be more problematic in litigation among multiple parties,' but this Arti-
cle shall assume existence.7" Existence also means that some sovereign is
responsible for a regulated or taxed activity.
An applicable law should also be unique. Ideally, only one forum
should govern each dispute or only one sovereign should control each
activity. (In practice, uniqueness rules will generally minimize the
number of forums, but will not necessarily reduce the number to one.)
Uniqueness obviously reduces uncertainty and, less obviously, minimizes
inefficient rent-seeking behavior and maximizes activity levels. Two
classes of legal devices serve these economic goals. One class is designed
to provide ex post uniqueness, which ensures that only one adjudicator
will hear a dispute. This class is more commonly viewed as preventing
double or multiple liability and includes such doctrines as res judicata,
mandatory joinder, interpleader and the law of judgments. In general,
these devices work well. The rare cases in which ex post uniqueness is
threatened, however, cause attorneys great concern.
Far more common is the problem of ex ante uniqueness or forum
shopping. Ex ante uniqueness is not regulated nearly as satisfactorily as
expost uniqueness. The devices that are supposed to ensure ex ante uni-
queness, such as forum non conveniens, choice of law and jurisdiction,
74. It is not difficult to justify the existence goal: existence is necessary because if no
cases are heard, no law exists and then actors are undeterred. It takes more effort to
justify the uniqueness goal. See infra notes 100-114 and accompanying text.
75. This appears simple but can be trickier than it seems. If sovereign A does not
view a certain fact as giving rise to a cause of action and sovereign B does, is existence
violated if sovereign B refuses to hear the case? Existence, as the term is used in this
Article, is not violated if sovereign A is willing to accept jurisdiction and then dismi
the claim because it fails to state a cause of action cognizable in the courts of A.
76. For example, sovereign A could have a rule that all disputes arising under the
laws of A could only be heard in the courts of B. If sovereign B has a rule that disputes
arising under the laws of A will not be heard in its courts, the property of existence is not
satisfied.
77. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 419 n.13
(1984).
78. A few cases may actually turn on existence. See, eg., Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v.
Texaco, Inc., 78 F.R.D. 445, 455-56 (D. Del. 1978) (doubtful existence of viable foreign
forum powerful factor in deciding not to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds).
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do not yield the predictable results generally guaranteed by the devices
that yield ex post uniqueness.
The analytical bane of ex ante uniqueness is the goal of optimality.
Rules designed to select the "best"79 adjudicator or rule are likely to
arrive at multiple or indeterminate adjudicators or rules. To reduce fo-
rum shopping, a uniqueness rule must be rigid. Optimality rules tend to
be more flexibleA0 Because little optimality is generally gained by divid-
ing a case among multiple adjudicators, ex post uniqueness seldom con-
flicts with optimality.
B. Contract, Tort and Optimality
This subsection attempts to develop an economically-cognizable op-
timality goal in conflicts. Such a goal is feasible if all aspects of a dispute,
including conflicts, are viewed strictly as bilateral disputes between two
parties. Economic theory has long been concerned with analyzing such
disputes, and a surprising amount of insight is gleaned from treating con-
flicts as part of a simple contract or tort dispute. Setting aside conflicts
for a moment, I start by reviewing the economic analysis of contract or
tort.
The most significant economic difference between contract and tort is
that the parties establish their duties in contract, while society imposes
duties in tort. From this perspective, contract law shares the same deter-
rence and compensation goals as tort law. The deterrence goal, which
assures efficient behavior, is more attractive and interesting to an econo-
mist than the compensation goal. This is not to say that the compensa-
tion goal plays no role. Although the wealth transfer from the defendant
to the plaintiff has no inherent economic interest, assuming the usual
rejection of intersubjective utility comparison, the possibility of compen-
sation assures deterrence because it provides the cheapest monitor of the
contract an incentive to do so.8" If another party (such as the state) is
the cheapest contractual monitor, plaintiffs need not receive compensa-
tion because the state assures deterrence through regulatory fines or
criminal penalties.
But there is an important distinction between contract and tort. Con-
tract rules are generally designed to further the intent of the agreeing
parties and therefore other state interests are usually unimportant.8 2 In
79. For a discussion of the "best" adjudicator or rule, see infra notes 81-92 and ac-
companying text.
80. See generally Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1969) (flexibility run
rampant).
81. The ex post decision made by the plaintiff to seek damages is pure rent-seeking
behavior. It is only justified by its ex ante deterrence consequences. See Posner II, supra
note 11, at 184-85. Victim compensation also plays a role when the victim is capable of
reducing the costs or frequency of the tort, a complication that is assumed away in this
Article's discussion.
82. Some contractual rules, such as duress, usury or disclosure laws, go to the genu-
ineness of consent. Others, such as the contractual limitations posed by antitrust law,
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tort, however, the state, not the plaintiff, has "contracted" for optimal
deterrence with the defendant. In this idealized scenario, the defendant
knows the law and adjusts activity levels accordingly. Viewed this way,
the laws of the state do not enforce the intent of the parties; they are the
intent of the parties when conjoined with defendant's activity levels. In
contrast to contract law, where the plaintiff negotiated for a deterrence
structure with the defendant, tort plaintiffs have no ex ante role. Their
only role is as ex post enforcers of deterrence.
Contract law and tort law both attempt to establish optimal deter-
rence. An ideal conflicts rule also seeks optimal deterrence. In the case
of contract law, the deterrence is set by the parties, and the conflicts law
of contracts, just like the ordinary law of contracts, attempts to imple-
ment the intent of the parties. This implies that state interest analysis is
inapposite to contractual conflicts law except when it bears on the plain-
tiff's capacity to contract or some contractual externality. Apart from
these exceptions, all states (should) have a similar interest in maintaining
freedom of contract.8 3
In the case of tort law, optimal deterrence, and thus the substantive
content of tort law, may be viewed as the result of a meta-contract be-
tween the state, acting on the plaintiff's behalf, and the defendant.'
This implies that tort analysis should balance the state's and the defend-
ant's interests, but not those of the plaintiff. The state has adopted the
plaintiff's individual interest by meta-contracting with the defendant on
behalf of the plaintiff. This is particularly clear in the case of regulation
(where there is no private plaintiff), but is equally applicable to tort,
where private plaintiffs only exist because they are low-cost monitors.85
This economic analysis stresses the roles that parties assume before,
rather than during, litigation. Although the defendant's role is almost
purely reactive in litigation, an economic analysis implies an active ex
deal with externalities. For the purposes of my analysis, this latter set of rules should be
treated more like tort than contract. Rules concerning whether a party genuinely con-
sented to the transaction are analytically more difficult-
83. "Should" is an enormous weasel-word, and states are unlikely to view their inter-
ests as unchanged when one of their citizens is a litigant against a non-citizen. The prob-
lem is similar to the one in cartelization. The system (if not every state) is better off if the
states did not pursue individual interests, but the incentives to free-ride are strong. The
assumption of non-opportunistic behavior is certainly often wrong positively, and may
also be wrong normatively when neighboring states are busy administering hometownjustice. See infra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
84. Cf. Korn, supra note 66, at 799 (state's interests are "best viewed as reciprocal
interests of each state and the people who associate themselves with it as domiciliaries in
regulating and being regulated by each other.")
85. This (meta-)contractualization of conflicts law is intended to serve the purposes of
economic analysis and not the political theory of conflicts law. Nevertheless, I note that
contract need not be viewed through utilitarian blinders, so that a contractualized con-
fficts law need not be as "policy"-ridden as conventional choice-of-law principles, and
may possibly serve as the basis for the non-consequentialist theory of conflicts called for




ante role. The defendant selects activity levels, drafts contracts and
chooses the jurisdictions in which to conduct activities.8 6 If the deter-
rence function of contract, tort and regulatory law is paramount, these ex
ante roles should determine ex post adjudication. 7
This discussion of tort and contract implies that the optimality goal of
conflicts is only significant for tort or regulatory law. In contract and
commercial law, the state plays a referee's role. Barring externalities and
issues of contracting parties' competence, the state's contractual and evi-
dentiary rules are mostly designed to ascertain the intent of the parties.
Unless one set of rules is clearly superior to another (a dubious empirical
assertion), there is no clearly superior adjudicator. For example, it does
not matter which state's statute of limitations is used, it just matters that
a certain state's statute of limitations is used. To the extent that the
state's role in contract is that of impartial referee and enforcer, the op-
timality goal is insignificant in contract; only the existence and unique-
ness goals are important.
This is not the case in tort or regulatory law. In the model, these laws
represent meta-contracts between the defendant and the state that pro-
tect third parties whom the state represents. Although the plaintiff
brings a tort suit (as the cheapest monitor of violations), the state makes
the rules and constrains the tortfeasor. The state receives the benefits of
its contract only when the tort defendant is the party whom the state
intended to deter in formulating the tort rule. The benefits in this meta-
contract, however, are clearly not internalized by the meta-contracting
parties. When the plaintiff sues, the forum must decide whether its meta-
contract with the defendant is applicable or whether another meta-con-
tract with a different state is more appropriate.
We can now better define the optimality goal of conflicts. A conflicts
rule leads to an optimal adjudicator or law when the chosen adjudicator
or law is the one best suited to enforce the (meta-) contract with the
defendant. In contract, this is comparatively simple because the best ad-
judicator or law is the one that the parties expect. With benign circular-
ity, an inflexible (and transparent"8 ) contractual conflicts regime
reinforces expectations, aligning the optimality and uniqueness goals.
86. I argue below that choosing to use a subsidiary structure is similar to limiting the
number ofjurisdictions in which to conduct activities. See infra notes 120-36 and accom-
panying text.
87. This implies that predictability is as much a virtue in tort law as it is in contract
law, even though it may be more difficult to craft a predictable tort than contract rule
that is consistent with optimality. Not all courts agree with this conception. See Keeton
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 131 N.H. 6, 17, 549 A.2d 1187, 1194 (1988) ("Predictability of
results, the first of our choice [of laws]- influencing criteria, is usually implicated only in
suits involving contractual or similar consensual transactions.")
88. If a contractual conflicts rule runs counter to intuition, inflexibility is a vice,
rather than a virtue. The problem is that intuitions tend to be contextual, and an intui-
tive, flexible rule runs counter to the uniqueness goal and does little to further the op-




In tort, the issue is far more complicated. The problem is whether the
conduct in question breached a meta-contract with a state to protect the
plaintiff, and, if so, which state(s) should act as proxy for the others. The
plaintiff's interests are insignificant. This observation, of course, is not a
significant improvement over conventional conflicts analysis. "Meta-
contracting" is unlikely to be any clearer than interest analysis (which it
closely resembles) or the Restatement factors. 89 The meta-contractual
viewpoint has the small advantage of casting interest analysis in terms of
a bargain that the defendant would have made in order to conduct the
activity for which it is being held liable. Unfortunately, this will decide
few cases.
Greater conceptual returns result from redefining the optimality goal
for tort. If optimality-enhancing rules do not seek the best adjudicator,
but rather seek to avoid bad adjudicators, then it is possible to align the
uniqueness and optimality goals. I call this modified optimality goal
"negative optimality." A search to avoid bad adjudicators is also a
search to reduce the number of possible adjudicators, which furthers the
uniqueness goal.' Successful tort conflicts rules, such as "minimum
contacts" jurisdiction,9 are frequently negative optimality rules.92 The
stunning success of the choice-of-law revolution-identification and elim-
ination of false conflicts-is actually a negative optimality rule.
C. Institutional Regimes
The relative weight given the optimality and uniqueness goals depends
upon the institutional regime in which the conflicts goals are embedded.
Conflicts law in the United States, policed by the Supreme Court, will
differ from conflicts law in the international sphere, where each adjudica-
tor is truly sovereign. Broadly speaking, there are three institutional re-
gimes in which conflicts law may be embedded: an "authoritarian"
regime, a "republican" regime and a "public-choice" regime.
The authoritarian regime consists of a decentralized federal system
where a central authority promulgates conflicts rules for subordinate de-
cision-makers who have some independence in developing substantive
law. The authoritarian regime may take several forms. The present
United States constitutional conflicts law, in which state conflicts rules
are loosely policed by the Supreme Court, is but one example. One may
also envision a central court of conflicts in which conflicts questions are
resolved before remand to subordinate substantive courts. Supremacy
Clause jurisprudence is another authoritarian conflicts regime. At a suf-
ficient level of abstraction, a court's decision to interfere with private or-
89. See supra note 68.
90. The converse is not true. Rules that further the uniqueness goal need not further
the negative optimality goal. A search for the worst adjudicator, or even an astrologically
based rule, could equally satisfy the uniqueness goal.
91. See supra note 4.
92. Section IV discusses how the subsidiary serves as a negative optimality rule.
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dering may also be an authoritarian conflicts regime.93
The republican and public-choice regimes are clearly distinguishable
from the authoritarian regime because both involve completely autono-
mous decision-makers. The difference is in the goals of the decision mak-
ers. A public-choice regime tries to maximize the welfare of its own
citizens (or of a dominant interest group), 94 while a republican regime
attempts to maximize society's welfare." A republican regime with per-
fect information and perfect rationality will thus yield the same conflicts
law as a perfect authoritarian regime. Real-world sovereigns fit some-
where between the republican and public-choice regimes.
The nature of the optimality goal differs significantly in republican and
public-choice regimes. In a republican regime, optimality benefits all,
while in a public-choice regime it benefits (some of) each sovereign's citi-
zens. Although the uniqueness goal has the same rationale in both re-
gimes, its weight relative to the optimality goal differs.
It is possible that republicin and public-choice regimes will produce
similar results. Public-choice conflicts rules do not result in the invaria-
ble victory of the hometown litigant.96 No forum has a "hometown-
party-always-wins" rule. Not only does it invite retaliation from other
legal systems, but such a forum soon finds itself depleted of all foreign
93. See Cover, The Supreme Court 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 4, 40-44 (1983).
94. The dominant-interest-group variant of the public-choice regime can be very sig-
nificant in the real world. Consider Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674
(Tex. 1990), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 2602 (Aug. 30, 1990), in which the
Supreme Court of Texas abolished the forum non conveniens doctrine in order to permit
Costa Rican nationals to sue a Texas corporation in Costa Rica. See Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d
at 689 (Hightower, J., concurring). This decision could not conceivably benefit Texas,
which, if anything, has an interest in exporting toxic petrochemicals to nations whose
laws do not adequately internalize the cost of these chemicals. A more limited public-
choice model stressing interest groups within the Texas polity may provide a better expla-
nation for the Alfaro decision, as may a genuine republican model. Admittedly, the
Texas plaintiffs' bar is strong, but is it strong enough to overcome in-state oil interests
without transferring any wealth to Texas non-lawyers?
95. Like a republican regime, an authoritarian regime may also strive to maximize the
welfare of all, but it need not cope with the problem of good-faith disagreements among
decision-makers. An authoritarian regime can further subdivide into regimes in which
the subordinate courts are republican and regimes that attempt to maximize only their
own citizens' welfare.
96. "Hometown plaintiff" might be more accurate. If a public-choice sovereign is
constrained to write rules facially even-handed towards hometown and foreign litigants,
it will tend to favor plaintiffs over defendants, especially if operating in a full-faith-and-
credit milieu. There is much more money outside most jurisdictions than within most
jurisdictions, and thus verdicts that transfer wealth from abroad to home are more likely
than the converse. Such verdicts are maximized if plaintiffs have as many causes of ac-
tion as possible. Furthermore, there is little wealth to be gained by the local defendants'
bar for pro-defendant laws, and considerable wealth to be gained by both plaintiffs' and
defendants' bars for pro-plaintiff laws.
A true cynic could carry this reasoning one step further. Lawyers' wealth is increased
when rules are uncertain but results can still be affected by lawyers' interventions. Is the




assets, either through asset mobility or through the transfer of foreigners'
assets through hometown judgments. In the long term, this presump-
tively reduces welfare, although the short-term wealth transfer might ar-
guably exceed the long-term loss of foreign assets. A bit of apparent
republicanism, then, is good business for a public-choice sovereign."7 A
public-choice regime, however, is not expected to duplicate the conflicts
law of a republican regime. Each public-choice sovereign will find itself
in an equilibrium that somewhat favors its citizens over foreigners.
Another similarity between republican and public-choice regimes is
that other sovereigns react to their conflicts law as well as to "extraterri-
torial" aspects of their substantive law. Indeed, the old conflicts notion of
"comity" can be taken primarily as a signal to treat others in an even-
handed fashion and thus be treated accordingly. (This rule can be given
a republican, as well as a public-choice twist: even republicans need a
way to discipline those who try to harm the public good.) A similar
point can be made for the rules of international law, including those con-
cerning expropriations of property.98 Because the economics of signal-
ling is complex and indeterminate, 99 I will not expand on this interesting
subject, except to note that signalling may be viewed as a fourth goal of
conflicts, and that signalling tends to make republican and public-choice
behavior convergent. The authoritarian regime is unique in one respect:
signalling has almost no role. Subordinate adjudicators need to commu-
nicate only with their superiors and do not have to worry about each
other. Most of what follows in this Article implicitly assumes an author-
itarian regime. Thus, signalling is not relevant and is not discussed.
D. Forum Shopping
Forum shopping is widely viewed as an evil that intelligent conflicts
rules reduce. Although a reasonably satisfactory definition of forum
shopping exists,"c° scholars do not seem able to articulate why forum
shopping is evil,1 °1 nor do they even all agree that forum shopping is
97. Some hometown favoritism is still expected, however. Cf. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L &
R. § 202 (McKinney 1989) (for causes of action that accrued out of state, foreign plaintiff
limited to shorter of New York or foreign statute of limitations; New York plaintiff may
use longer one).
98. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 711-13 (1987).
99. For a discussion of signalling, see J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organiza-
tion 118-21 (1988).
100. See supra note 66, at 282. Professor Korn's definition is not universally accepted,
especially by a judiciary that views "forum shopping" as evil but still favors a smart
shopper. Cf Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 131 N.H. 6, 18, 549 A.2d 1187, 1194 (1988)
("Forum shopping in the classic sense refers to a plaintiff's attempt to have a court apply
the law that will win her the most favorable verdict, not to her attempt to find a forum
whose statute of limitations will allow it to entertain her otherwise legitimate suit."). As
Justice Souter pointed out in dissent in Keeton, the majority's rationale was massively
unconvincing. See id at 23-35, 549 A.2d at 1197-1205.
101. The scholarly literature provides little help. See eg., Baxter, supra note 72, at 9-
10 ("[The evils of forum shopping have been exaggerated."); Dane, supra note 73, at
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necessarily that bad. 2 This subsection discusses the economic evils of
forum shopping. Forum shopping is evil only because it compromises
the ex post uniqueness goal of conflicts law. I have already argued that
optimality is a legitimate goal that clashes with the uniqueness goal.10 3
Some forum shopping, therefore, should be expected in any conflicts re-
gime that values optimality. This unavoidable forum shopping may be a
fair price to pay for a desirable balance between the uniqueness and op-
timality goals. The question, then, is not whether forum shopping is
good or bad. Forum shopping always generates costs, but may also con-
fer benefits. The real question is whether the forum shopping permitted
by conflicts rules is excessive or insufficient. The remainder of this sub-
section addresses the costs of forum shopping.
1. Degraded Information
As discussed above, contract, tort and regulatory laws are designed to
deter economic actors in an efficient manner."10 Contract law is designed
to foster efficient breach; tort law should foster efficient creation of risk;
regulatory schemes should internalize costs efficiently. In this economic
framework, parties are free to act while legal liability provides general
deterrence. This theory assumes that the breaching party knows what its
actions are and appreciates their legal consequences.
Forum shopping degrades the information available to the party con-
templating breach.105 Degraded information lowers welfare, both by
forcing unnecessary additional investment in information and by encour-
aging parties to act in ignorance. As a prospective opponent can shop
more possible jurisdictions, the necessary investment in multijurisdic-
tional legal research increases. Of course, resources are limited and only
a certain amount of legal research is cost efficient. When parties are effi-
ciently ignorant'06 of the law, subsequent unexpected litigation repre-
sents a pure welfare loss in a deterrence-based notion of the law.
It is important to note that this degraded information does not neces-
sarily imply unpredictability. The problem with forum shopping is not
1216 ("[fIt is unclear why forum shopping in the adjudicative context should strike us as
inherently distasteful, while other types ofjurisdiction-shopping-[such as] the establish-
ment of corporate residence ... give us little pause."). Professor Dane later clarifies his
own quandary. See Dane, supra note 73, at 1271.
102. See, e.g., Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudication Versus Automation in the Con-
flict of Laws, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 205, 244-45 (1958) (forum shopping can be "positively
commendable"); Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 Tul. L. Rev.
553, 570 (1989) ("[N]ot all forum shopping merits condemnation.").
103. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
105. Some contract-law doctrines address the problem of degraded information. For
example, the maxim that contracts should be construed against their drafter clearly
serves to improve the quality of information available to the non-drafting party. The law
of fraud may be similarly interpreted.
106. A party is efficiently ignorant when the marginal cost of gathering further infor-
mation equals the marginal expected benefits of this information.
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unpredictable results, but rather a distressing predictability." Basically,
the plaintiff is more likely to win. The plaintiff will pick the forum in
which its chances are best-a jurisdiction with favorable laws"0 8 con-
joined with pro-forum choice-of-law rules. The forum is a matter be-
tween the plaintiff (who proposes) and the court (which disposes). The
defendant's role is confined to attempting to influence the court. Forum
shopping, therefore, is different from most other sorts of degraded infor-
mation, which merely decrease predictability and can favor either plain-
tiff or defendant.
The effects of this uncertainty differ in tort and contract. The tort (or
regulation) effects are easier to understand. Forum shopping clearly in-
creases litigation and legal research costs. The possibility of forum shop-
ping, which invariably expands liability, also reduces activity levels.1°9
The same effects occur in contract law, but more subtle effects are also
present.
The uncertainty inherent in forum shopping encourages bizarre forms
of rent-seeking behavior. Because forum shopping favors plaintiffs, both
parties to a contract prefer to make the other party a defendant, assum-
ing that the appropriate law is found. This incentive to litigate first is
especially strong if a permissive conflict-of-law regime is conjoined with a
full-faith-and-credit rule that permits the judgments of the permissive fo-
rum to be honored everywhere. At worst, economic activity is
subordinated to rent-seeking as each party attempts to structure the
transaction to become the first to accrue a cause of action in some juris-
diction. This phenomenon, the propensity of imperfect information to
cause rent-seeking behavior, is well known in conventional contract law.
"Fine print," for example, is frequently included in order to create
breaches in ways the breaching parties did not expect. Contract law fre-
quently tries to nullify this advantage. This phenomenon has also been
used to explain why courts approach stipulated damages clauses with
107. Baxter phrases this concept a little differently. He states that forum shopping
hinders "primary predictability" (at the transactional level), while probably improving
"secondary predictability" (at the level of litigation). See Baxter, supra note 72, at 9.
Forum shopping does not necessarily improve even secondary predictability. Secondary
predictability decreases when the case is shopped from ajurisdiction in which the plaintiff
will clearly lose to a jurisdiction in which the plaintiff has a sporting chance.
108. Some plaintiffs do not search for favorable substantive laws, but rather seek a
favorable trier of fact. Other plaintiffs may seek favorable discovery rules, damages rules,
certain forms of preliminary relief or favorable statutes of limitations. See generally
Juenger, supra note 102, at 558-60 (reasons for forum shopping other than diversity of
substantive law). The Supreme Court occasionally seems to believe that only substantive
law can be shopped at forums. Compare Ferens v. John Deere Co., 110 S. Ct. 1274, 1282
(1990) (implying that shopping for venue is not true forum shopping) with Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) (listing plethora of plaintiff's bargains in
United States forums, including "malleable choice-of-law rules," jury trials, lack of taxa-
tion of losing party with winning party's fees, as well as favorable substantive law).
109. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
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diffidence.' 10 Neither real conflicts rules nor substantive laws, however,
are sufficiently divergent to realize the rent-seeker's goal. Furthermore,
contractual forum-selection clauses reduce, but do not eliminate, con-
tractual conflict-of-law problems."'1
2. Forum Shopping, Permissiveness and Sovereigns' Goals
If economic actors were omniscient, degraded information would not
be problematic, but forum shopping still would be. An omniscient ac-
110. See Clarkson, Miller & Muris, Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Non-
sense?, 1978 Wisc. L. Rev. 351, 366-72.
111. If forum-and-law-selection clauses were easy to execute and enforce, commercial
conflicts would be a virtually empty field. See Medoil v. Citicorp, 729 F. Supp. 1456,
1458-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Many transactions, however, even those for millions of dollars,
are not accompanied by detailed written contracts. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A., v. Wells
Fargo Asia Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034, 2040-41 (1990) (interbank placement market contract
silent as to where collection of debt should take place). Also, American courts often
consider written contractual forum-and-law-selection agreements but do not necessarily
feel bound by them. See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1972) ("Forum-selection clauses have historically not been favored by American
courts."); Annotation, Validity of Contractual Provisions Limiting Place or Court in
Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R.4th 404, 415-18 (1984) (citing cases where
courts applied a reasonableness test to determine whether forum-selection clauses should
be upheld). But see Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 108 S.Ct. 2239, 2349-50 (1988)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (praising policy behind enforcement of forum-selection
clauses); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,
J.) (forum-selection agreements should be treated identically to other contractual agree-
ments).
Furthermore, it is easy for a court to minimize the effect of such agreements. Cf Trinh
v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1170 (6th Cir. 1988) (contractual "provisions must be
explicit and must clearly and unmistakably inform" parties to be enforceable), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 2602 (1990). A particularly bold court might simply ignore the existence
of such an agreement completely. Compare Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 865-66 (2d Cir. 1981) (not discussing any disclaimers pertinent to
conflicts), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982) with Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A., No. 77 Civ. 1251 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1980) (LEXIS, GENFED Library, 2DIST
File) (the lower-court opinion discusses such disclaimers), rev'd, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 976 (1982).
State courts are quite free to ignore forum-selection clauses and such clauses are
against public policy in some states. See, eg., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Foster, 382 So.2d
554, 556 (Ala. 1980) ("Contract provisions which attempt to limit the jurisdiction of the
courts of this state [are] invalid and unenforceable as being contrary to public policy.");
Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1972) ("Venue for the
trial of a lawsuit ... is a matter of public concern and the venue statutes are structured in
accord with a number of public policy principles."); Annotation, Validity of Contractual
Provisions Limiting Place or Court in Which Action May Be Brought, 31 A.L.R.4th 404,
409-11 (1984) (citing cases that found forum-selection clauses invalid as against public
policy).
Even when a court considers choice-of-law agreements, a court employing the Restate-
ment of Conflicts factors, supra note 68, has adequate flexibility to favor the party it
prefers. Compare Cook v. Frazier, 765 S.W.2d 546, 549-51 (Tex. 1989) (contractual
choice-of-law provision specifying Utah law for purchase of Utah and Arkansas land,
voided for Arkansas contracts on grounds of insufficient contacts with Arkansas and for
being an attempt to transact around Texas usury law) with Uniwest Mortgage Co. v.
Dadecor Condominiums, Inc., 877 F.2d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1989) (similar facts, also ap-
plying Texas conflicts law, opposite conclusion).
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tor's behavior is deterred by the rules of every forum that is willing to
hear the case and apply its laws. In this case, the problems are not in
contract-type law. These problems can be transacted around (albeit at a
cost) if courts enforce their contracts. Instead, the dilemma lies in tort
and regulatory law. The most permissive or pro-plaintiff tort and regula-
tory standards will prevail throughout the system.
Permissiveness is clearly inefficient in a public-choice regime. Some
sovereigns benefit from permissiveness' 2 through the implicit subsidy
that pro-plaintiff standards give to such a country's legal system.' ' A
revenue-hungry sovereign would therefore construct rules that maximize
litigation. These rules might not even be clearly pro-plaintiff. A system
that encourages antagonistic parties to evaluate their chances of success
differently promotes litigation over settlement.
This gross sort of permissiveness is not inherent in republican or au-
thoritarian regimes. Permissiveness, however, creates a more subtle
problem common to all three conflicts regimes. Let us assume that all
three regimes have efficient municipal law (with the public-choice regime
efficient only for its citizens). Except perhaps for the authoritarian re-
gime, the resulting multijurisdictional law will be inefficient. To the ex-
tent that forum shopping permits the plaintiff to select the forum, each
sovereign's pro-plaintiff substantive laws will be accentuated while the
pro-defendant substantive laws are attenuated. This will result in a sys-
tem where different but individually efficient laws become globally
overdeterrent of activities. This effect can be adjusted if each sovereign
makes its municipal law somewhat underdeterrent. Such an adjustment,
however, will be less effective than that in a legal system with optimal
municipal laws and good conflicts rules.
Actually, the issue is more complex than it initially appears. I have
described a state of affairs in which sovereigns have fundamentally differ-
ent laws. Loose conflicts regimes ensure that these laws, collectively, are
overdeterrent. But a similar problem exists even when the laws are fun-
damentally the same. Legal systems, even if roughly efficient overall and
responsive to similar exogenous conditions, occasionally permit exces-
sively high activity levels and occasionally permit excessively low levels.
If forum shopping is allowed, plaintiffs can exploit this variation to their
advantage, selecting forums that permit excessively low activity levels in
the particular fact pattern of the plaintiff's case. Again, the joint legal
system will excessively discourage activity levels, even if all legal systems
are roughly similar.
A final problem with permissiveness relates to one of the chief eco-
112. This is reminiscent of the corporate law "race to the bottom," in which Delaware
(and the Delaware bar) receives fees for providing the environment most hospitable to
incorporators. It is frequently argued that this enhances welfare to the extent that incor-
poration is a consensual act. Litigation is not a consensual act and a litigious race to the
bottom may not enhance welfare.
113. See supra note 94.
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nomic advantages of a multi-sovereign legal system: its capacity for di-
versification and experimentation. This advantage is realized, albeit in
different ways, in all three conflicts regimes. An overly permissive set of
rules that shifts all litigation to the most pro-plaintiff sovereign elimi-
nates this advantage without ensuring the benefit that a single sovereign
provides--consideration of the polity's welfare.
There is one circumstance in which permissiveness is beneficial. As-
suming that courts and governments worldwide are generally too slow to
impose appropriate safety standards, the most safety-conscious sovereign
is the best adjudicator. Because plaintiffs, who control forum-selection,
have an interest in the lowest activity levels, permissiveness tends to fur-
ther the optimality goal. This argument, however, may falter on empiri-
cal grounds. Frequently, a sovereign with unique rules is not
progressive, but simply unique.1
1 4
3. Legal Transitions
To the extent that substantive laws can be circumvented contractually,
conflicts problems are limited but not eliminated. Problems still emerge
from legal transitions." 5 In such cases, conflicts rules become particu-
larly important. International legal transitions are not a hypothetical
problem introduced for the sake of intellectual completeness. They have,
for example, dominated recent international banking decisions.' 16
When a legal transition occurs, it has both prospective and retrospec-
tive effects. The prospective effects of the legal transition may well be
beneficial, but most commentators assume that the retrospective effects
are harmful.' ' Through careful choice of rules, it is possible to reduce
retrospective effects but it is impossible to eliminate them. Forum shop-
ping increases the retrospective effects of a change in laws. If forum
shopping is readily available across jurisdictions, the retrospective effects
114. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984). In Keeton, the statute
of limitations in every jurisdiction except New Hampshire had run on plaintiff's libel
claim. See id. at 773. In addition, plaintiff had no contact with New Hampshire except
that the magazine that allegedly damaged her reputation enjoyed a small circulation in
the New Hampshire market. See id. at 772. New Hampshire nevertheless had jurisdic-
tion to hear the case and decide libel damages for harm caused throughout the entire
country. See id. at 773-74. The outcome in Keeton is not outlandish, which suggests the
confused nature of contemporary conflicts jurisprudence.
115. Legal transitions are changes in the law that disturb expectations. See Kaplow,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 511, 520 (1986).
116. See J. Sommer, supra note 60, at 32-43; Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 29,
at 734-36; Note, Holding U.S. Bank Home Offices Liable for Deposits in Their Foreign
Branches, 11 Fordham Int'l L.J. 621, 629-33 (1988).
117. The benefit derives from the social good conferred by the new rule. To an econo-
mist, the social good results from the prospective effects of the improved incentive struc-
tures designed by the sovereign. A new rule, however, also redistributes wealth
retrospectively. To the extent that parties invest real resources into minimizing this
wealth redistribution, retrospectivity involves real welfare losses. Also, retrospectivity
may result in loss of specific assets. See Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroac-
tivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, 49-52 (1977).
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of legal transitions will multiply. For example, consider a conflicts-of-
law regime that permits adjudication of a contract in one of five forums.
To simplify matters, also assume that each forum will apply its own law.
At the time of drafting, the relevant laws of all five forums were congru-
ent. If one of the forums has a legal transition that affects private rights,
the party that benefits from the transition has a strong incentive to sue
the other in that forum. The legal transition problem is different from
the degraded information problem in that the defendant may well have
had perfect information about the pre-transition law at the time the con-
tract was drafted.
Now consider what happens if the parties can specify only one forum.
Again, one of the five jurisdictions undergoes a legal transition, but now
there is only one chance in five that the transitional jurisdiction will be a
forum. The social gain remains the same, but the social loss attendant to
litigation is reduced five-fold because the litigation is a wealth transfer
accompanied by litigation losses. In this case, litigation does not enforce
the intent of the parties, but rather is an unnecessary windfall given to
the plaintiff by the state that effectuated the transition.
To recapitulate, forum shopping causes several kinds of welfare losses:
uncertainty (increased rent-seeking behavior, suboptimal activity levels,
economically useless investment in information, raised transaction costs),
dominance by permissive legal regimes (distorted rules, suboptimal activ-
ity levels, reduced dynamism) and legal transitions. The next section dis-
cusses the subsidiary device, which significantly reduces these losses by
limiting forum shopping.
IV. THE SUBSIDIARY AS A SOLUTION TO CONFLICT-OF-LAW
PROBLEMS
A. Background
The subsidiary doctrine is a remarkably successful transactional con-
fficts device, embodying all three design goals of conflicts. It ensures the
existence of some forum to hear a dispute because the subsidiary is al-
most always subject to the law of its state of incorporation. More impor-
tantly, it is a powerful negative optimality device that reconciles the
uniqueness and optimality goals of conflicts remarkably well. The sub-
sidiary enhances uniqueness, allowing actors to minimize the number of
forums in which they are liable, by compartmentalizing activities. Such
compartmentalization generally reduces the number of possible forums
to one or a few. The sovereigns that the subsidiary excludes are unlikely
to be good adjudicators. The subsidiary thus serves a purpose similar to
the notion of domicile in general conflicts law, but permits multiple, non-
overlapping domiciles for enterprises engaged in multijurisdictional ac-
tivities. As with my discussion of conflicts, my discussion of the subsidi-
ary shall be grounded in contract and tort law, although it may also be
1990]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
applicable to unexpected areas of the law, such as anti-discrimination 18
and corporate law. 19 It is not, however, applicable to antitrust law.
1. The Subsidiary in Contract
The subsidiary works differently in contract and tort. Because con-
tracts frequently involve different places of performance and multiple
places of formation, "the contract field is widely thought to be the most
intractable in all conflicts."' 2° The subsidiary simplifies the complex
problems that emerge in contract.' 2' By compartmentalizing various as-
pects of performance, parties may structure agreements to break transac-
tions into sub-transactions, each simple from a conflicts perspective. 2
Much of this simplification stems from jurisdiction. If a party conducts
activities only within the home state, it is subject to suit only in this
state.123 The subsidiary is also useful when a choice-of-law analysis is
118. See Boureslan v. Aramco, Arabian Am. Oil Co., 892 F.2d 1271, 1274 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. granted, EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 40 (1990). In Aramco,
a unitary organization incorporated in the United States allegedly discriminated against
an American citizen overseas. The plaintiff lost the case based on the court's interpreta-
tion of legislative intent. See Aramco, 892 F.2d at 1273-74. If the organization had com-
partmentalized into subsidiaries, the case would have been clear-cut: the statute would
not have applied to a foreign violation by a foreign party. See also Mas Marques v.
Digital Equip. Corp., 637 F.2d 24, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1980) (employment case, corporate veil
respected); Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Multinational Enter-
prise, 73 Geo. L.J. 1465, 1483-86 (1985).
119. A jurisdictional principle such as the subsidiary is of limited importance in a field
like corporate law, where the choice-of-law principles are quite determinate. See
Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 Duke L.J. 1, 9-15. Jurisdiction occa-
sionally becomes an interesting issue, however. See Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105,
1111-12 (Del. 1988).
120. Korn, supra note 66, at 804.
121. As discussed above, contractual clauses specifying forum and law are extremely
useful conflicts devices, although they are not panaceas. See supra note 111. The subsidi-
ary has an advantage over even enforceable conflicts clauses; it makes contracting easier.
Most contracts made by lawyers routinely contain conflicts clauses. Nevertheless, many
contracts are not made by lawyers. Included in this group are contracts made by very
sophisticated parties, such as participants in the interbank placement market. See Ci-
tibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034, 2035 (1990). In this sense, the
subsidiary device serves as a sort of master conflicts clause made at the highest levels of
the corporation as part of strategic planning. It enables lower-level activities to proceed
without sophisticated input from high-level management.
122. An excellent example is Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd., 110 S. Ct. 2034
(1990). This case involved an interbank deposit between a Singapore subsidiary of an
American bank and a Manila branch of another American bank. See id. at 2037. The
question was whether Philippine or American law would govern the deposit. See id. at
2039. The choice-of-law issue was significant because the Philippine government had
imposed a freeze on all Philippine bank liabilities. See id. at 2038. The transaction in-
volved clearance through the American parent of the Philippine branch. See id.
This case, vital to the international banking community, has been remanded to the
Second Circuit. See id. at 2039. The separate entity doctrine, which treats international
branches as juridically separate entities, provides a simple solution to this problem while
avoiding complex choice-of-law problems.
123. Of course, it depends on what is mdant by "conducting activities." Cf. Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479-82 (1985) (expansive notion of "conducting
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involved, for it tremendously simplifies much of the choice-of-law
calculus. If both parties use the subsidiary device or if one party is a
single-jurisdictional entity, all choice-of-law rules point to the same fo-
rum, except perhaps for the place of contracting: the place of perform-
ance is the domicile of the parties; the parties' intent is clarified by their
decision to incorporate in the place of performance; and other states have
weak affiliations to the contract. 124
As an example of the subsidiary's power, consider a contract between
a Nigerian national and a Nigerian subsidiary of a multinational corpora-
tion; the contract will be performed in Nigeria and could have been made
anywhere. Assume that this contract does not have an explicit choice-of-
law or choice-of-forum clause. Foreign courts will probably not enter-
tain jurisdiction over such a contractual dispute, much less consider ap-
plying their foreign laws. Under United States conflict-of-law principles,
the mere existence of the parent is not a contact sufficient to justify juris-
diction if the Nigerian parties had no other contacts with the United
States.'25 The existence of the subsidiary might also point towards
Nigerian substantive law, even if United States jurisdiction were some-
how established.
If the subsidiary form is not used, a large barrier to foreign jurisdiction
is removed. This situation raises the specter of forum shopping. Cer-
tainly, the home country of the multinational is a good forum candidate.
But what if the Nigerian business is a joint venture between multination-
als of two home countries? What if the multinational's home country is
not the country in which it conducts most of its business? What if the
multinational's line of business most closely related to the Nigerian en-
terprise is in yet another country? 2 6 Plaintiffs shop hard for favorable
forums. The subsidiary device is a means of controlling this problem. 127
activities" includes making payments to office in the forum and being subject to that
office's final authority).
124. See Note, Interest Analysis Applied to Corporations: The Unprincipled Use of a
Choice of Law Method, 98 Yale L.J. 597, 610-13 (1989). The author observed that "[tihis
Note's critique of interest analysis in the corporate context will not apply to purely do-
mestic corporations, which, by the nature of their activity, are usually not involved in
choice of law litigation." Id. at 597 n.1. This Article's thesis is that the subsidiary can
transform most corporations into domestic corporations.
This hints at a division of labor between jurisdiction and choice-of-law principles. If
jurisdiction serves as a relatively rigid negative optimality device, employing lexfori is a
justifiable general rule. The task of choice of law then becomes interstitial: to identify
(perhaps even contextually) the cases in which jurisdictional rules, conjoined with lex
fori, do not identify a reasonably good law. The discretion provided by Section 6 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is far less threatening if used as an escape from
the forum's law, rather than an excuse for employing such law. A less extreme version of
this suggestion may be found in Shreve, supra note 69, at 57-62.
125. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 414
comment h (1986); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 52 comment b (1969).
126. Similar hypothetical fact patterns are reviewed in Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note
38, at 8-15.
127. Although I believe that the subsidiary is consciously used in precisely this way, it
is remarkably difficult to find writers who note this. But see Thompson, United States
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In essence, the subsidiary permits parties to compartmentalize their
legal obligations by compartmentalizing their business operations. If two
multijurisdictional enterprises perform a transaction that is localized
within a jurisdiction, or perform a series of localized 128 transactions, the
subsidiary cleanly separates legal obligations. If both parties use the sub-
sidiary in similar ways, most transactions and the relevant entities will be
within the same jurisdiction, making conflicts law invisible in litigation.
2. The Subsidiary in Tort
The subsidiary excludes jurisdictions in which the defendant's connec-
tion is only through affiliation. In this respect, the subsidiary refines the
"minimum contacts" due process test. 129 The minimum contacts test,
which denies jurisdiction to states in which the defendant has no signifi-
cant activity, is a negative optimality test. The rationale for the mini-
mum contacts rule in tort is that states having insufficient contacts with
the defendant cannot have entered into a meta-contract with the defend-
ant.130 Because there is neither an optimality nor a uniqueness rationale
for considering such jurisdictions, jurisdictions without minimum con-
tacts should not be considered in tort.
The subsidiary doctrine refines the minimum contacts test by not fac-
toring affiliate contacts into the analysis. Only contacts by the defendant
that created the cause of action are jurisdictionally sufficient. The sub-
sidiary is defensible if such affiliate-only contacts are unlikely to result in
good' 3 ' adjudicators. The subsidiary rationale, therefore, depends on the
kinds of contacts that are likely to uncover a good adjudicator. 1 2 Con-
Jurisdiction over Foreign Subsidiaries: Corporate and International Law Aspects, 15 Law
& Pol'y in Int'l Bus. 319, 368 (1983) (acknowledging subsidiary's role in reducing
number of possible forums in which plaintiff could sue).
128. An excellent example of this is the fact pattern of Citibank, N.A. v. Wells Fargo
Asia, Ltd., 110 S.Ct. 2034 (1990). See supra note 122.
129. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in International Shoe and the
"minimum contacts" test, see supra note 4. This discussion, although crafted with
United States law in mind, is sufficiently general so that it is pertinent to international
law.
130. Minimum contacts is a much weaker device on the contracts side because I derive
contractual conflicts law from the actual intent of the parties, rather than through a
meta-intent derived from a state's laws. But the states that the subsidiary would elimi-
nate-those where the defendant does no business-are unlikely to be intended by either
of the parties, unless perhaps an excluded state is the domicile of the plaintiff. This was
the problem faced by the court in Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
Rather than abandon minimum contacts in contract, the Burger King court finessed the
issue by holding that the defendant "conducted business" in the plaintiff's jurisdiction.
131. Because the subsidiary is a negative optimality test, it does not search for the
optimal adjudicator. It merely seeks to distinguish good from bad adjudicators and ex-
clude these inferior adjudicators. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
132. For reasons previously discussed, this question is pertinent mainly to tort and
regulatory law; in contract, the optimality goal is subordinated to the uniqueness goal.
See supra text accompanying note 88. But the subsidiary, by reducing the number of
possible forums and by naturally compartmentalizing complex multiforum transactions,
helps advance the uniqueness goal.
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tacts that are implicated in the cause of action (those creating specific
jurisdiction) are certainly likely to produce good adjudicators. But these
specific jurisdictional contacts are only dependent on the actions of the
defendant implicated in the cause of action, and thus by their nature ex-
clude affiliates. If these specific jurisdictional contacts were the only ones
likely to lead to good adjudicators, the subsidiary formalism can be
viewed as a sub rosa near-abolition of general jurisdiction. Subsidiary
compartmentalization will give each juridical entity an incentive to oper-
ate only within the laws of one sovereign. To the extent that this coinci-
dence is achieved, general jurisdiction becomes a meaningless concept:
the adjudicating sovereign is always the one in which the particular inci-
dent occurred.
The subsidiary's conflicts aspect, then, can be challenged only if gen-
eral jurisdiction is desirable and if affiliate contacts are useful in estab-
lishing general jurisdiction. It is unclear, however, whether general
jurisdiction is justifiable in tort. It is difficult to envision a meta-contract
in which a sovereign lets all parties sue a given defendant on all causes of
action regardless of where accrued, simply because that defendant con-
ducts sufficiently continuous activities within the jurisdiction. Unless it
is drumming up business for its legal system, why would a state wish to
protect a foreign plaintiff for a foreign cause of action?
Nevertheless, general jurisdiction has a strong intuitive appeal, and my
framework should accommodate most consequentialist approaches to
conflicts. My inability to justify general jurisdiction is probably due to
lack of imagination. But intuitively, general jurisdiction, even if justified,
needs some sort of limitation, and cannot extend to every unrelated activ-
ity of an enterprise. Even if a theory of general jurisdiction can fit my
framework, I am fairly confident that such a theory will have no room
for affiliate contacts.
The practical power of the subsidiary to simplify contemporary tort
conflicts law should not be underemphasized. As with contract, defend-
ants have an ex ante incentive to structure their affiliates in ways that
maximize the subsidiary's jurisdictional benefits. Consequently, the sub-
sidiary structure assures that plaintiffs and defendants are generally
placed in one unique jurisdiction where specific and general jurisdiction
converge. The subsidiary thus reduces the difficult cases in which the
plaintiff, defendant and action are in three separate jurisdictions. In
such cases, it is hard to determine which state has entered into a mean-
ingful meta-contract with the defendant to protect the plaintiff's legiti-
mate interests, or which state's laws the plaintiff and defendant may be
deemed to have contemplated. In contrast, when the defendant and the
plaintiff are in the same jurisdiction, the conflicts inquiry is fairly simple.
This is true for both choice-of-law and jurisdictional analysis. The only
case in which the new choice-of-law learning gives unambiguous results
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is when both parties are domiciliaries of the same state. 133 Although a
theory of general jurisdiction might indicate that the subsidiary com-
promises the optimality goal in tort in a few cases, it doubtlessly aids the
uniqueness goal a great deal.
Even though the subsidiary seems useful in tort, most cases that pierce
the jurisdictional veil appear in tort 134 and most are correctly decided.
Unfortunately, the subsidiary doctrine conjoins limited liability with ju-
ridical separateness, which poses problems in tort. Although the juridi-
cal separateness branch of the subsidiary doctrine correctly identifies the
jurisdiction, its limited liability aspect frequently ensures that sufficient
assets cannot be found in the jurisdiction. This recurrent fact pattern
strains the subsidiary doctrine greatly and causes most veil-piercing exer-
cises by courts. Such exercises are sensible if specific jurisdiction over
local corporations exists, such as when the tort occurred in the forum
state.' 35 The tort problem will be discussed in more detail below. 136 At
133. See Korn, supra note 66, at 788-89.
134. See, eg., Omega Homes, Inc. v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 656 F. Supp. 393, 399
(W.D. Va. 1987) (most cases cited to court in which jurisdictional veil pierced were in
tort or products liability); Note, Jurisdiction over Alien Corporations Based on the Activi-
ties of Their Subsidiaries in the Forum: Whither the Doctrine of Corporate Separateness?,
9 Fordham Int'l L.J. 540, 560-76 (1986) (discussing mainly tort, antitrust and patent
cases).
135. The best reasoned of these cases may be Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co.,
508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). In Bulova, the court asserted personal jurisdiction
over a foreign parent based on its subsidiary's actions in the forum. See id. at 1340-41.
Judge Weinstein reasoned that jurisdiction was proper because the parent owned all the
subsidiary's stock and the parent would have had to penetrate and expand the New York
market if the subsidiary did not exist to do it. See id. at 1340-42; see also Boryk v.
deHavilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666, 667 (2d Cir. 1965) (parent subject to U.S. juris-
diction where its wholly owned subsidiary has several of the same directors and parent
company's employees perform many of subsidiary's services and operations); Waters v.
Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273, 276 (Del. 1984) (German parent subject to U.S. jurisdiction
where forum state is home to affiliate, which is sole conduit for parent's products in
United States); Taca Int'l Airlines v. Rolls-Royce, Ltd., 15 N.Y.2d 97, 101-02, 204
N.E.2d 329, 330-31, 256 N.Y.S.2d 129, 131-32 (1965) (parent subject to jurisdiction
where it shares several directors with wholly owned subsidiaries, staffs the subsidiary and
determines subsidiary's important policies). The courts, however, do not always pierce
the corporate veil in such cases. Compare Boryk, 341 F.2d at 668 (piercing veil because
subsidiary is a shell) with Cook v. Bostitch, Inc., 328 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1964) (refusing to
pierce veil even though subsidiary is a shell).
When specific jurisdiction cannot be found, it is not possible to rationalize jurisdic-
tional veil-piercing, barring misrepresentation of the parent-subsidiary relationship. See,
e.g., Miller v. Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d 769, 772 (1st Cir. 1985) (no in personam
jurisdiction because parent company lacked minimum contacts with forum); Fogel v.
Hertz Int'l, Ltd., 141 A.D.2d 375, 376, 529 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 (Ist Dep't 1988) (jurisdic-
tion over parent could be proper where public led to believe that parent was responsible
for its foreign subsidiary). Fogel is particularly interesting. The plaintiffs sued the Amer-
ican parent company for injuries allegedly incurred by the negligence of the foreign sub-
sidiary. The court appeared to treat the plaintiffs' claim as one for American
misrepresentation of the foreign subsidiary's safety, rather than as a claim for the subsidi-
ary's negligence. This sort of all-American claim, which compartmentalizes the foreign




this point, I shall discuss the Cannon doctrine, which underpins the ju-
ridical separateness of subsidiaries.
B. The Cannon Doctrine
As discussed above,' 37 the main significance of the subsidiary doctrine
lies in forum selection rather than in choice of law. 3 ' Cannon is the
leading case supporting the subsidiary doctrine for jurisdictional pur-
poses. In Cannon, the Supreme Court held that "use of a subsidiary does
not necessarily subject the parent corporation to the jurisdiction" of the
state in which the subsidiary is incorporated. 39 Cannon does not imply
that jurisdiction is unobtainable over an affiliate. It merely indicates that
jurisdiction over a local affiliate does not necessarily convey jurisdiction
over related foreign affiliates. Some other jurisdictional basis is
necessary.
Although an old case, Cannon has survived the International Shoe'o
revolution and is still good law. 4' A 1948 case vitiated Cannon,42 but
136. See infra notes 155-61 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
138. The subsidiary may also have some significance in venue, or at least patent venue.
See Wydick, Venue in Actions for Patent Infringement, 25 Stan. L. Rev. 551, 578-80
(1973).
139. Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 336 (1925) (citing Conley
v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 406 (1903)). Justice Brandeis seemed quite aware
of the subsidiary's transactional conflicts role:
The existence of the [wholly owned subsidiary] as a distinct corporate entity is,
however, in all respects observed. Its books are kept separate. All transactions
between the two corporations are represented by appropriate entries in their
respective books in the same way as if the two were wholly independent corpo-
rations. This corporate separation from the general Cudahy business was
doubtless adopted solely to secure to the defendant some advantage under the
local laws
Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
140. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
141. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984) (jurisdiction
over parent does not establish jurisdiction over wholly owned subsidiary); 18A Fletcher
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §§ 8773-74 (1988) (general service re-
quirements on parents, subsidiaries and holding companies); Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 414(2) (1987) (state does not necessarily
have jurisdiction over parent merely because its subsidiary is operating in that state);
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 52 comment b (1971) (citing Cannon approv-
ingly but noting that jurisdiction over subsidiary can give jurisdiction over parent if par-
ent controls subsidiary's internal operations). While recent Supreme Court decisions
have done much to reinvigorate Cannon, some commentators had thought that Interna-
tional Shoe killed the doctrine. See P. Blumberg, supra note 48, at 66-67; Cardozo, A
New Footnote in Erie v. Tompkins: "Cannon is Overruled", 36 N.C.L Rev. 181, 185
(1958); Wellborn, Subsidiary Corporations in New York" When is Mere Ownership
Enough to Establish Jurisdiction Over the Parent, 22 Buff. L. Rev. 681, 683-85 (1973).
142. See United States v. Scophony Corp. of Am., 333 U.S. 795, 813 (1948). But see
National Carbide Corp. v. Comm'r, 336 U.S. 422, 438 n.21 (1949) (contemporaneous
post-International Shoe case noting without disapproval that petitioner had adopted sub-
sidiary organization in order to avoid service in every state).
The Court's decision in Scophony can be dismissed as a judicial aberration. Scophony
1990]
266 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59
the Supreme Court has more recently reaffirmed Cannon as a matter of
policy'43 and has possibly even constitutionalized it as a matter of due
process. " Although unpopular among commentators, 45 the case is still
viable in the lower courts'" despite suffering increasing lower-court at-
tack in recent years. 147 For example, in New York the Cannon doctrine
is applicable only when subsidiaries seem sufficiently separate from the
was an antitrust case and the same Supreme Court that weakened the antitrust jurisdic-
tional subsidiary theory was willing to adopt a crabbed separate entity formalism to per-
mit prosecution of a parent and subsidiary for conspiracy under Section One of the
Sherman Act. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951),
overruled, Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Kiefer-
Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951), overruled, Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). But see Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 763-64, 777 (1984) (overruling the Kiefer-Stew-
art line of cases); United States v. Citizens & Southern Banking Ass'n, 422 U.S. 86, 116-
17 (1975) (transitional case).
Nevertheless, commentators disagree as to Scophony's effect on Cannon. Compare P.
Blumberg, supra note 48, at 47 ("The [Scophony] decision even suggested that Cannon
might not be good law .... ") with Note, supra note 134, at 552-53 ("There is no language
in the Scophony opinion that indicates that Cannon is no longer good law.").
143. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 n. 13 (1984) (court stated
in dictum that "jurisdiction over a parent corporation [does not] automatically establish
jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary").
144. See Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 108 S.Ct. 2104, 2111 n.** (1988) (dictum).
If the substantive standard [for service] tracks the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it is not self-evident that substituted service on a sub-
sidiary is sufficient with respect to the parent. In the only cases in which it has
considered the question, this Court held that the activities of a subsidiary are
not necessarily enough to render a parent subject to a court's jurisdiction, for
service of process or otherwise.
Id. at 2111 n.**.
Cannon was not a constitutional case and it is uncertain that International Shoe made
it one. See Brunswick Corp. v. Suzuki Motor Co., 575 F. Supp. 1412, 1419 (E.D. Wis.
1983); P. Blumberg, supra note 48, at 43-47; Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 38, at 3-7.
145. See, e.g., P. Blumberg, supra note 48, at 43-48 (reliance on formalistic Cannon
standard still common, though its authority significantly eroded by International Shoe);
E. Scoles & P. Hay, supra note 7, at 337 (Cannon may be modified to allow jurisdiction
over parent or subsidiary when parent and subsidiary act as a "single functional eco-
nomic entity"); Cardozo, supra note 141, at 181-87 (Erie overrules Cannon); Wellborn,
supra note 141, at 683-89 (criticizing Cannon's general rule that ownership of subsidiary
insufficient to subject parent company to jurisdiction in state where subsidiary is doing
business); C. Wallace, Legal Control of the Multinational Enterprise 118 (1982) (Cannon
"naive"). Only one recent commentator seems to like Cannon, more because the doctrine
comports with judicial precedent rather than because of any independent policy rationale.
See Note, supra note 134, at 594.
146. See 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1069 nn. 29-32
(2d ed. 1987); Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 38, at 7-8 n.36; see also R. Casad, supra
note 4, at 3.02[2][b][ix], 4.03[5], 5.03[3][b][ii] (large collection of cases); Annotation,
Ownership or Control by Foreign Corporation of Stock of Other Corporation as Constituting
Doing Business Within State, 17-18 A.L.R.2d Later Case Service 282-86 (1987 & Supp.
1990) (citing many cases both denying and supporting service of process); 18 A.L.R.2d
187 (1951) (same).
147. See R. Casad, supra note 4, 3.02[2][b], at 3-84 ("It does appear from reading the
cases, however, that there is a growing uneasiness among the courts about the continued
authority of the Cannon rule, and cases in which the requisites for jurisdiction are found
are relatively more common than in earlier years.") (footnote omitted).
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whole enterprise. This test is vague enough to have permitted at least
one New York court to rule that it is an abuse of a trial court's discretion
to believe that any Cannon argument could possibly be frivolous. 4 8
Oddly enough, New York law strongly respects the corporate veil on
matters of limited liability.149
The subsidiary organization's personality is also recognized in interna-
tional law. The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States limits a sovereign's ability to regulate subsidiary organiza-
tions more than it does branch organizations: 150
Unlike a foreign subsidiary, a foreign branch is not a distinct juridical
entity; the factor of separate incorporation in the host state being ab-
sent, the exercise of jurisdiction by the state of the parent by analogy to
the exercise of jurisdiction under the nationality principle... is not
implausible.... However, since there is potential for conflict between
the state of nationality and the territorial state, the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over foreign branches by the state of the parent is also subject to
limitations. 151
C. Cannon and Tort.: Enterprise and Entity Theories
The cost of linking juridical separateness and limited liability is not
particularly high in contract. In contract cases, judges seldom pierce the
corporate veil because the plaintiff contracted for the subsidiary structure
and should live with its consequences 152 even if the subsidiary is a thinly
148. See Mareno v. Rowe, 910 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1990). The law in Delaware, for
example, seems much more clear but scarcely more helpful because almost any non-pas-
sive involvement by the parent in the subsidiary is sufficient to enable a court to pierce the
Cannon veil. See eg., Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1125 (Del. 1988) ("We hold
that GenCorp's ownership of RKO General is a minimum contact with Delaware which
is sufficient to support an exercise of specific jurisdiction by the Delaware Courts over
GenCorp .... "); Waters v. Deutz Corp., 479 A.2d 273, 275 (Del. 1984) (similar holding).
Nor is it difficult for a New York court to dismiss Cannon when it chooses to do so. See,
eg., Volkswagenwerk A.G. v. Beech Aircraft, 751 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1984) (existence
of jurisdiction over foreign corporation); Re v. Breezy Point Lumber Co., 118 Misc.2d
206, 209, 460 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (Sup. CL 1983) (evidence existed to merit a hearing with
respect to jurisdiction).
149. See eg., American Protein Corp. v. AB Volvo, 844 F.2d 56, 60 (2d Cir.) (inter-
locking directorates not sufficient proof to allow court to pierce corporate veil), cert. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 852 (1988); Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 599 F.2d 34, 35-36 (2d Cir.
1979) (corporate veil not pierced where seller knowingly entered into contract with shell
corporation established for specific purpose of entering into this contract); Walkovszky v.
Carlton, 18 N.Y.2d 414, 418-19, 276 N.Y.S.2d 585, 588-89, 233 N.E.2d 6, 8-10 (1966)
(corporate form will not be pierced merely because subsidiary lacks insurance).
150. Compare Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 414(1) (1986) (states may exercise jurisdiction for limited purposed with respect to ac-
tivities of foreign branches of corporations organized under its laws) with id. § 414(2)
(states may not ordinarily regulate activities of corporations organized under foreign
state's laws based on fact that they are owned or controlled by nationals of regulating
state).
151. Id. at § 414 comment a.
152. Cf Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 347 n.6 (2d Cir. 1942) ("The
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capitalized shell,"5 3 unless misrepresentation occurred.5 4 The chief cost
of this approach is using the inefficient off-the-rack rule of limited liabil-
ity. Given the subsidiary's advantage in conflicts, it is probably a net
winner in contract, at least outside the banking industry.
Tort, however, is a problem. Limited liability makes little sense in tort
and cannot be circumvented contractually. As a response to this prob-
lem, courts have been developing various strategies for piercing the cor-
porate veil in tort and regulatory cases. In regulatory cases, the courts
frequently look to the regulatory purpose of the statutes to determine
whether to pierce the veil."55 A more general response involves replacing
Cannon's formalistic "entity theory" and common-law veil-piercing cases
with a contextual "enterprise theory."
The entity theory initially views the subsidiary as an entity separate
from the parent and inquires whether any factors exist that militate
against this separation.1 5 6 The "enterprise theory," purporting to follow
business reality, 57 is less solicitous of the separation between parent and
subsidiary. This theory respects this distinction only when the parent
resembles a passive investor in the subsidiary and tends not to respect the
distinction when the parent substantially controls the subsidiary.
The enterprise theory is becoming more popular with time, even in
cases in which juridical separateness, as opposed to limited liability, is
important. The enterprise theory reigns in United States tax law'5 8 and
only real [difference] between tort and contract cases in this field [is]... the possibility
that, in contract cases, the plaintiff chose to deal with the subsidiary ....").
153. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Waxman, 599 F.2d 34, 35-36 (2d Cir. 1979) (unjust
to pierce corporate veil where seller knowingly transacted with shell subsidiary); Fisser v.
International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960) (refusing to pierce veil where par-
ent's officers expressly indicated that subsidiary would be solely responsible for perform-
ing contract).
154. The standard for misrepresentation is generally very high in commercial contract.
Compare Oriental Commercial & Shipping v. Rosseel, N.V., 702 F. Supp. 1005, 1022-23
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (intent to deceive implies disregard of corporate separateness) with
Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960) (negotiations conducted by
officers of parent company not sufficient reason to pierce veil where officers of parent
company stated that negotiations were on behalf of subsidiary that would have sole re-
sponsibility for performing contract).
155. The leading case is Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349 (1944). See generally Note,
supra note 47, at 853 (federal common law ought to examine federal statutory policy
rather than state corporation law).
156. Fraud, in which the subsidiary misrepresents its relation to the parent, would be a
very good reason to ignore juridical separateness (at least for purposes of granting limited
liability).
157. See, eg., P. Blumberg, supra note 48, at 23-25 (companies in a corporate group
should be viewed "as a unit" or as a "group enterprise" and not as distinct legal entities);
Berle, supra note 27, at 348-50 (fiction of corporate separateness is undermined by eco-
nomic fact that though there may nominally be two or more corporate personalities,
there is only one enterprise).
158. Cf. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 440-42 (1980) (eco-
nomic reality of unified business enterprise is not undermined by fact that income is
transformed into dividends from legally separate entities and will not affect the parent's
portion of income). Taxation lends itself well to the enterprise ("unitary," in tax jargon)
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appears with increasing frequency in tort law. Indeed, cases employing
some version of the enterprise theory are sufficiently numerous that at
least one commentator suggests that Cannon's entity theory is obsolete
and is being replaced in the courts by an enterprise theory of the firm, at
least for procedural law.159
Intellectually, the enterprise theory is far preferable to the old-fash-
ioned entity theory, with its ritualistic veil-piercing formulations of "alter
ego" or "instrumentality" taken so far that a subsidiary has "no separate
mind, will or existence of its own."" What kind of "complete domin-
ion" is more complete than 100% stock ownership? The enterprise the-
ory's distinction between active and passive investment is far more
meaningful than the conventional legal formulae. But the enterprise the-
ory suffers from one enormous flaw: haziness of goals. There is a real (if
confusing) difference between active and passive investments, but it is
difficult to see why jurisdiction or liability should attach to an active in-
vestment and not a passive one.16 Even a relatively autonomous subsidi-
ary will be monitored sufficiently closely by its sole owner so that the
owner will usually satisfy the test of respondeat superior. And why
should jurisdiction relate to control?
The trend towards enterprise liability is disturbing. The enterprise
theory goes both too far and not far enough. As to limited liability, the
corporate form should almost always be breached for torts. As to juridi-
approach because interjurisdictional transfer payments are frequently easy to manipulate,
making it difficult to compartmentalize tax liability jurisdictionally.
159. P. Blumberg, supra note 48, at 23-25.
160. I have cribbed these incantations from 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Pri-
vate Corporations § 43.10 (1983). Scholars of the corporate veil have long amused them-
selves by compiling these lists of incantations. See P. Blumberg, supra note 48, at 8;
Douglas & Shanks, supra note 14, at 195.
161. The usual goal adduced for jurisdictional law is "fairness"; such a goal, however,
is extremely hazy. Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), may be the best-reasoned case decided under the enterprise theory. Judge Wein-
stein wrote an excellent primer on multinational business relations but could not convinc-
ingly justify the relationship between the conclusions of this primer and the jurisdictional
issue presented:
To any layman it would seem absurd that our courts could not obtain jurisdic-
tion over a billion dollar multinational which is exploiting the critical New
York and American markets to keep its home production going at a huge vol-
ume and profit... The law ignores the common sense of a situation at the
peril of becoming irrelevant as an institution.
An apparent growing tendency by the Supreme Court to view jurisdictional
bases narrowly in the interest of what it considers to be fairness to defendants is
reflected in a few recent cases. Unreasoned extrapolation of such cases can lead
to unfairness to plaintiffs who may be denied a natural forum unless the court
carefully analyzes the economic and social realities of the "significant contacts
between the litigation and the forum."
Id. at 1327 (quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980)) (citations omitted).
What is the purpose of having "significant contacts" and a "natural forum"? (What is a
"natural forum"?) But Bulova Watch was correctly decided. Two wrong rulings---exces-
sive respect for limited liability and excessive disregard of juridical separateness--pro-
duced the right law: a claim under United States law for defendant's assets.
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cal separateness, the corporate form should seldom be breached, even in
tort. The enterprise theory can be justified only if it is impossible to un-
bundle juridical separateness and limited liability. In such a case, the
enterprise theory may present a second-best solution, permitting plain-
tiffs to have undesirably generous forum-shopping privileges in return for
undesirably limited liability.
D. The Utility of Juridical Separateness
Section I demonstrated that the subsidiary doctrine was not a welfare-
enhancing risk-shifting device. This section has thus far demonstrated
that the subsidiary doctrine and the resulting juridical separateness is a
transactional conflicts device that may reduce forum shopping. Neither
Section I nor this section has demonstrated that the subsidiary doctrine is
an empirically significant conflicts device. Such a demonstration is very
difficult.
An examination of case law will not prove this hypothesis. Parties
seldom litigate cases that they will definitely lose. Significant case law
usually flourishes where a doctrine is legally unstable or fuzzy. The un-
questioned core applications of a doctrine, even though commercially
significant, will seldom be questioned.
Far better evidence of the subsidiary's conflicts role is the fact that
multinational subsidiaries are usually organized by country rather than
by product line.' 62 This tendency is probative, not dispositive. One can
argue that different countries comprise different markets and thus require
separate organizations. The counterargument, that organizational sepa-
rateness does not connote legal separateness, is not fully effective because
it is based on logic and the link may be customary. 163 The overt role
given the subsidiary in international tax planning is further evidence that
the subsidiary is used as a conflicts device. The subsidiary is a conscious
tool of international taxation'" and international taxation is simply con-
flicts law applied to tax.
The difficult problem of significance may be attacked with a concept
derived from systems analysis. Well-functioning systems seldom reveal
162. Cf J. Bonbright & G. Means, supra note 19, at 88 ("Many large industrial corpo-
rations have selling and even manufacturing branches in foreign countries, and it is com-
mon practice to have these branches carried on by separate corporations chartered in the
country in which they operate."); Hadari, The Structure of the Private Multinational En-
terprise, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 731, 748 (1973) ("Most marketing-oriented American-based
MNEs operate abroad through subsidiaries and affiliates, while many service corpora-
tions (particularly banks and advertising agencies) and firms in extractive industries oper-
ate through branches.") (citations omitted); Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at
741 ("Unlike other multinational enterprises, which almost invariably operate through
subsidiaries-i.e., separately organized firms usually incorporated in the country in which
they are established-banks generally operate in countries other than their home base
through branches, without separate incorporation in the countries in which they are
established.")
163. See J. Bonbright & G. Means, supra note 19, at 37-40.
164. See supra note 8.
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their inner workings. A black-box analysis of well-functioning systems
only contains information about the goals of the system, not about the
means that implement these goals. Poorly functioning systems reveal far
more information.16 The private international law of contracts works
fairly well, but it may not be because the subsidiary is an important doc-
trine.166 In order to establish that the subsidiary is important, it is neces-
sary to disable the doctrine and examine whether the disabled system
works as well as the original.
This "experiment" is possible. As I explained above,"6 ' banks cannot
afford the subsidiary structure. International banks, however, need ju-
ridical separateness. The various international private law doctrines in
banking law amount to a type of subsidiary, even though they contain no
provisions for limited liability. They all serve the conflicts function of
the subsidiary. This resemblance is even greater because it did not occur
self-consciously. There is little awareness of any relationship between in-
ternational banking law and the subsidiary doctrine. 68
Until 1980, this law worked adequately and thus was not useful in
determining the business necessity of juridical separateness. Fortunately
(from an analytical perspective), this law has been transformed since
1980 and it is now difficult for a bank to avoid application of United
States law to depositors who transact with their foreign branches.1 69 The
current doctrine is internally chaotic and its application is unpredictable.
It has also provoked a great deal of unfavorable comment from the schol-
arly community1 70 as well as from the business press.' Many of the
165. Cf H. Simon, The Sciences of the Artificial 13 (1969) ("A bridge, under its usual
conditions of service, behaves simply as a relatively smooth level surface on which vehi-
cles can move. Only when it has been overloaded do we learn the physical properties of
the materials from which it is built.").
166. In other words, is the subsidiary an insignificant doctrine that causes little harm
and evolved by chance (such as the requirement that juries consist of exactly twelve peo-
ple), or is it required for the successful operation of private international law? Cf S.
Gould, Wonderful Life 277-99 (1989) (role of contingency in biological evolution; must
reading for common-law efficiency theorists).
167. See supra notes 57-59, 162 and accompanying text.
168. But see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 414 reporter's note 6 (1987) ("(I]nterational banking is conducted primarily through
foreign branches of the parent bank rather than through subsidiaries. . . ."). Some vague
judicial notice of the connection may also be found in the case law. See, eg., Trinh v.
Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1988) (U.S. law applied to foreign branch
office's actions would not have applied to foreign subsidiary's actions); Vishipco Line v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1981) (same), cerL denied, 459
U.S. 976 (1982).
169. See Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 29, at 736 ("[IThe only rule that
emerges from the recent American and English judicial decisions [is) ... that plaintiffs
... nearly always win.").
170. Worse than unfavorable comment is the sheer volume of academic commentary.
In business law, doctrines work best when they are seldom litigated or discussed. Since
1980, the scholarly commentary on international banking law has gone from thin to
dense. See generally Bazyler, Abolishing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. Pa. L Rev. 325
(1986) (conflicts law of international banking); Chow, Rethinking the Act of State Doc-
trine: An Analysis in Terms of Jurisdiction to Prescribe, 62 Wash. L. Rev. 397 (1987)
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resulting cases, and most of the recent cases, attracted government and
private amicus briefs, 72 a good sign that the affected business communi-
ties disagree with the courts. Not all of the private amicus briefs are
prompted by special-interest pleading. The Wells Fargo 173 and Allied
Bank 174 courts received briefs from the New York Clearing House Asso-
ciation even though both parties were banks.
While business opinion regarding a legal doctrine is frequently unre-
lated to the public merits of the doctrine, vociferous business disagree-
ment is a strong indication that a legal doctrine is significant, if not
desirable. I previously established that juridical separateness can be a
desirable transactional conflicts device and that it is probably not a harm-
(same); Logan & Kantor, Deposits at Expropriated Foreign Branches of U.S. Banks, 1982
U. Ill. L. Rev. 333 (same); Smedresman & Lowenfeld, supra note 29 (same); Note, supra
note 116 (same); Tigert, Allied Bank International- A United States Government Perspec-
tive, 17 N.Y.U.J. Int'l Law & Politics 511 (1985) (same); Zaitzeff & Kunz, The Act of
State Doctrine and the Allied Bank Case, 40 Bus. Law. 449 (1985) (same); Note, The Act
of State Doctrine: Resolving Debt Situs Confusion, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 594 (1986) (same);
Note, Allied's Flawed Application of the Act of State Doctrine: Impropriety of the Doctrine
In International Finance, 20 Cornell Int'l L.J. 253 (1987) (same); Comment, Reducing
Liability ofAmerican Banks for Expropriated Foreign Branch Deposits, 34 Emory L.J. 201
(1985) (same); Note, Throwing a Monkey Wrench into the Wheels of International Fi-
nance: Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 11 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1039 (1990) (same).
171. A recent international attachments case, S.E.C. v. Wang, 699 F. Supp. 44
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), has provoked a small firestorm of controversy. In Wang, the court at-
tempted to attach an account in a Hong Kong branch. This would have been impossible
if the branch were a subsidiary, as the court would not have had jurisdiction over the
Hong Kong entity. See The Long Arm of the SEC, The Economist, June 10, 1989, at 16;
Franklin, Banks Take on the SEC, N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1989, at 5-6; Labaton, U.S. Judges
Study Seizure of Cash in Securities Case, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1989, at D2, col. 5; Kalet-
sky, U.S. Appeal Stirs Fear of Financial Intrusion, Fin. Times, May 31, 1989, § 1, col. 8;
Sesit, International Furor Arises over Order From U.S. Court on U.K. Bank's Funds, Wall
St. J., May 30, 1989, at B8, col. 5.
172. On appeal, the Wang court received amicus briefs from the British government,
the New York Clearing House Association and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
The case settled after a hearing before the Second Circuit but before the court rendered a
decision. See Kraus, Standard Chartered Bank Wins Release of Funds Frozen by SEC,
Am. Banker, August 4, 1989, at 3.
The government frequently participates in amicus briefs when private parties are in-
volved. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 852 F.2d 657, 658 (2d Cir.
1988) (participation by New York Clearing House Association, Institute of International
Bankers and branches of United States government, including Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Comptroller of Currency
and the Departments of State, Justice and Treasury), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990); Trinh
v. Citibank, N.A., 850 F.2d 1164, 1165 (6th Cir. 1988) (participation by Justice Depart-
ment), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2602 (1990); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola
de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir.) (participation by New York Clearing House
Association, The Rule of Law Committee and branches of United States government,
including the Federal Reserve and the Departments of State, Justice and Treasury), cert.
dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985); Perez v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 61 N.Y.2d 460, 463-64,
474 N.Y.S.2d 689, 690, 463 N.E.2d 5, 6 (participation by New York Clearing House
Association and New York State Bankers Association), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984).
173. Wells Fargo Asia Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., 110 S. Ct. 2034 (1990).
174. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 473 U.S. 934 (1985).
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ful one. The open question is that of its significance. The strong business
and academic reaction to the banking cases shows that juridical separate-
ness is a significant and useful transactional conflicts device.
I now turn to the final question. If the juridical separateness conferred
by the subsidiary is significant and welfare-enhancing, and if the limited
liability conferred by the subsidiary is significantly welfare-detracting (in
the case of torts, at least), why are limited liability and juridical separate-
ness yoked into the subsidiary?
V. WHY THE SUBSIDIARY?
There is no clear answer to this question. Actually, this question con-
sists of two sub-questions: does limited liability make any sense, and, if
not, why has it persisted? In response to the first question I can advance
one rather subtle argument for coupling limited liability with juridical
separateness. In response to the second question I can formulate a hy-
pothesis but cannot arrive at a satisfactory answer.
A. A Limited Apology for Limited Liability
I have argued that the personality conferred by the subsidiary is a nec-
essary conflicts device, while limited liability is an unnecessary risk-shift-
ing device. Although I believe that both statements are independently
correct, some of the subsidiary's conflicts efficiency may arise from lim-
ited liability.
International law exists in a mixed and decentralized framework of
republican and public-choice components. Such a system is strained
when substantive laws diverge considerably and distrust of other sover-
eigns' motives is great. Even a republican sovereign will wish to protect
its citizens from having their wealth transferred by a public-choice sover-
eign. The Cannon doctrine, coupled with unlimited liability, gives pub-
lic-choice sovereigns a tempting mechanism to transfer foreign wealth, a
mechanism that the old-fashioned subsidiary weakens.
Consider a foreign judgment that exceeds the assets of the subsidiary
and requires accessing the firm's worldwide assets. The Bhopal litigation
is exemplary. The United States district court dismissed the case on fo-
rum non conveniens grounds provided that the United States parent ac-
cept foreign jurisdiction."' Such a disposition is not uncommon and is
equivalent to the Cannon doctrine with unlimited interaffiliate liabil-
ity.'76 My analysis has so far indicated that such a result is desirable.
But what if the motivation behind such judgments is inconsistent with
175. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
176. Such conditional forum non conveniens actions are actually quite common. See
Annotation, Validity and Propriety of Conditions Imposed Upon Proceeding in Foreign
Forum by Federal Court in Dismissing Action Under Forum Non Conveniens, 89 A.L.R.
Fed. 238 (1987). The relationship between Cannon and the forum non conveniens doc-
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the foreign sovereign's treatment of its local residents who lack foreign
assets? Should these judgments then be recognized? Probably not. 177
Therefore, under the Cannon-plus-unlimited liability doctrine I have de-
veloped, foreign courts will confront the delicate task of substantively
evaluating another sovereign's extraterritorial application of its own law.
In some cases, such as the Bhopal litigation, the foreign judgment would
probably be enforced. Other judgments might not receive such
enforcement.
The same result could occur with limited-liability subsidiaries but in a
different procedural posture. If the foreign judgment exceeds the assets
of the foreign subsidiary, the foreign sovereign will not collect anything
because of the limited liability doctrine. To collect extraterritorially, it
must obtain independent judgments against and jurisdiction over the
worldwide affiliates according to internationally accepted standards.1
78
The affiliates' domestic courts will be in a less delicate position because
the rules of jurisdiction are relatively clear and the grounds for non-rec-
ognition of jurisdiction are less offensive than other grounds for non-rec-
ognition of judgments.' 79
Although this argument is rational, it is not convincing. International
law provides clear grounds for nonrecognition of the most blatant
hometown decisions.18 Although it is easier to resolve matters at the
jurisdictional stage, rather than at a more substantive stage, I doubt that
trine has been noted previously, albeit in a slightly different context. See P. Blumberg,
supra note 48, at 79-80.
The biggest problem with the forum non conveniens solution (apart from its contextu-
ality) is its reliance on a legal fiction so strong as to shock the conscience. Frequently, the
party pleading forum non conveniens is a domestic party pursued by foreign claimants
who are perfectly willing to litigate in the hometown forum, frequently with most of the
discoverable material domestically located. See, e-g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas
Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195, 197-98 (2d Cir. 1987) (foreign plaintiffs sue Union Carbide
in Southern District of New York); Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674,
682-89 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., concurring) (Texas state court denied defendant's mo-
tion for dismissal under forum non conveniens doctrine in case brought by 82 Costa
Rican plaintiffs in the Texas court), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 2602 (Aug. 30,
1990). Phrased this way, the doctrine is indeed outrageous. As I point out below, labels
are important. The sense of outrage may well diminish if the defendant is a subsidiary
created at the foreign scene of the wrongdoing and the domestic litigation uses the dena-
tured "sovereignty" rationale for limited jurisdiction. Cf World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980) (state court may not assert personal
jurisdiction over non-resident defendant in absence of minimum contacts with state be-
cause to do so would infringe on other states' sovereignty).
177. I did not develop an economic theory of enforcing foreign judgments in Section
III, and thus admit that this statement is unsupported. A better developed theory of
conflicts would probably focus on an analysis rooted in game theory for non-authorita-
rian conflicts regimes.
178. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 482(l)(b) (1987).
179. Compare id. § 421(2) (clear specifie jurisdiction rules) with id. § 482(2)(d) (broad
grounds for non-recognition of foreign judgments "repugnant to the public policy of the
United States").
180. See id. at § 712.
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the difference is enormous. Furthermore, because the argument does not
apply to intrajurisdictional limited liability, it does not establish a general
case for retaining limited liability. At most it makes a case for transjuris-
dictional actions. If the reader agrees that this argument is unconvinc-
ing, the question remains why the current version of the subsidiary
doctrine persists.
B. The Subsidiary in History
The subsidiary is more than the sum of devices that shift risk and con-
fer juridical separateness. It has a historical dimension. The subsidiary
doctrine arose from corporate law rather than finance, tort or conflicts
law. The corporation, although generally designed to function in the
present, may still bear the marks of its history. Thus, historical, rather
than legal, reasons may explain why limited liability is still coupled with
juridical separateness.
The key aspects of the corporation emerged at various times.
Although limited liability was a general feature of corporate law by the
mid-nineteenth century,181 the subsidiary generally was not possible until
an 1889 New Jersey statute permitted corporations to own stock in other
corporations. 182 Corporate conflicts law was an intermediate develop-
ment. "Prior to the 1850s, it was either assumed or required that the
operations of corporations would be confined to their chartering
state."' 3  After this time, foreign corporations began to operate with in-
creasingly limited restrictions on entry, especially after the Supreme
Court decided Paul v. Virginia'" in 1868. Corporate conflicts law,
therefore, had a chance to develop between the 1850s and 1890 without
the conflicts alternative of the subsidiary. The nineteenth-century con-
flicts law applicable to the foreign corporation is familiar: corporations
that did business within a state were subject to the state's jurisdiction in
181. The key case may be Wood v. Dummer, 30 F. Cas. 435, 436 (C.C.D. Me. 1824)
(No. 17,994). It is not certain if limited liability had any practical meaning in an era
when corporate stock generally remained only partially paid.
182. See Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Cor-
porate Privileges, 14 J. Legal Stud. 129, 161-62 (1985). Some parent/subsidiary corpora-
tions had previously existed by special charter. See J. Bonbright & G. Means, supra note
19, at 58-64.
The concept of the subsidiary depended on one other key idea: a corporation may limit
the liability of even a sole shareholder. This notion seemed to develop in the 1890s. The
leading case may be the English case of Salomon v. Salomon & Co., [1897] App. Cas. 22,
1895-9 All E.R. 33.
183. See Butler, supra note 182, at 151. It may be possible to push Professor Butler's
dates back by ten years or so. The first significant corporate conflicts case may have been
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Peters) 519, 584-97 (1839), overruled on other
grounds, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), which established
that corporations may make valid contracts in foreign states if the foreign states do not
explicitly object.
184. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), overruled on other grounds, United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
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tort and contract 8 5 but more weakly on matters of internal corporate
law.
1 8 6
The invention of the subsidiary had little effect on the explicit conflicts
law of tort and contract. The subsidiary was used exuberantly in regula-
tory conflicts, however. Entities initially used the subsidiary to transact
around the remaining restrictions on foreign corporation entry, with na-
tional holding companies operating regulated industries that were re-
quired to have state charters under state law.18 7 By the early twentieth
century, entities consciously used the subsidiary in other regulatory con-
flicts situations and for the nascent multinational corporations.""8 I
have, however, seen only one express reference in the secondary litera-
ture to conscious use of the subsidiary for common-law conflicts.18 9
185. See, e.g., Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 376-78 (1877) ("doing business"
gives jurisdiction over foreign corporation); Gray v. Taper-Sleeve Pulley Works, 16 F.
436, 442-43 (W.D. Pa. 1883) (same); North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64
Md. 151, 153, 20 A. 1039, 1040 (1885) (citing Maryland "doing business" statute of
1868); Gibbs v. Queen Ins. Co., 63 N.Y. 114, 124-25 (1875) (New York case involving
"doing business").
186. The internal affairs doctrine seems to have had a tortured history. It was articu-
lated as early as 1868, but seemed to take time to become dogma. See Howell v. Chicago
& N.W. Ry. Co., 51 Barb. 378, 383-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868), overruled, Prouty v. Michi-
gan S. & N. Indiana R.R. Co., 1 Hun. 655, 658 (1st Dept. 1874). Maryland strongly
endorsed the internal affairs doctrine in 1885. See North State Copper and Gold Mining
Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 153-55, 20 A. 1039, 1040-41 (1885). Nevertheless, it took New
York a long time to come around. The internal affairs doctrine was adopted, as a matter
of prudence, by 1899, but even a 1915 court refused to agree with the full force of North
State. See Travis v. Knox Terpazone Co., 215 N.Y. 259, 263-66, 109 N.E. 250, 251-52
(1915) (Cardozo, J.); Lewisohn Bros. v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 26 Misc. 613,
622-24, 56 N.Y.S. 807, 814-15 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
187. See J. Bonbright & G. Means, supra note 19, at 33; Douglas & Shanks, supra note
14, at 193. These holding companies were used to evade effective state regulation of
industries such as utilities and railroads. See J. Bonbright & G. Means, supra note 19, at
35-37. In the days before pervasive federal regulation, a multistate holding company
provided many opportunities to avoid local regulation, as the holding company provided
services at super-market prices that would evade the cost-plus accounting of state
regulators.
188. The Cannon case is one example. Bonbright & Means offer another example:
Many large industrial corporations have... branches in foreign countries, and
it is common practice to have these branches carried on by separate corpora-
tions chartered in the country in which they operate.... Frequently a subsidi-
ary is maintained to carry on the business of the parent which is local to a
particular state. Sometimes this is done to simplify tax accounting or to reduce
taxes, and sometimes to meet special franchise conditions.
J. Bonbright & G. Means, supra note 19, at 88.
189. See Thompson, supra note 127, at 368. Some writers were aware that the subsidi-
ary involved jurisdictional questions. See Cataldo, Limited Liability with One-Man Com-
panies and Subsidiary Corporations, 18 Law & Contemp. Probs. 473, 489-90 (1953);
Douglas & Shanks, supra note 14, at 204-05. These jurisdictional questions, however,
were viewed as irrelevant to a discussion of limited liability and were "dismissed ...
without more ado." Douglas & Shanks, supra note 14, at 204-05.
The jurisdictional questions received more attention when viewed separately, in terms
of the Cannon doctrine. Most of this attention has been paid by proponents of the enter-
prise theory who would overturn Cannon. See P. Blumberg, supra note 48, at 67-71;
Cardozo, supra note 141, at 185; Wellborn, supra note 141, at 683-84.
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Why was the subsidiary knowingly used in every context except as a
common-law domestic conflicts device? Perhaps more significantly, why
did limited subsidiary liability continue to be the norm? While I do not
have a well-grounded historical answer, one hypothesis is worth explor-
ing. The corporation was never viewed in a purely functional sense, but
rather continued to carry its historical baggage. 9 ° Perhaps unless the
demand for a particular corporate attribute is great, the historical bag-
gage of a corporation can deter the functional development of corporate
law. Similarly, unless the damage done by a particular corporate attri-
bute is great, it may be carried along with the overall concept of the
corporation.
The corporation's historical baggage is most evident in the notion of
the corporate entity. American law consists of nominalist personification
of the corporation wrapped in realist rhetoric. The most elegant realist
wrapper was written in 1927:
a corporation is more nearly a method than a thing, and... the law in
dealing with a corporation has no need of defining it as a person or an
entity, or even as an embodiment of functions, rights and duties, but
may treat it as a name for a useful and usual collection of jural rela-
tions, each one of which must in every instance be ascertained, ana-
lyzed and assigned to its appropriate place according to the
circumstances of the particular case, having due regard to the purposes
to be achieved.191
Yet realism has generally existed only as rhetoric. Judges and legal
scholars frequently invoke a brisk realistic piety and immediately shift to
nominalist personifications based on case law or inapposite analogy. 92
190. This notion is very similar to-and perhaps almost identical to-Professor Ha-
ger's notion of an "iconic," as opposed to "logical," dimension of legal argument. Hager,
Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational "Real Entity" Theory, 50 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 575, 576-78 (1989).
191. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 119, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 543-
44 (Sup. CL 1927).
192. My favorite example is Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915 (D. Haw. 1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). In trying to extend the "subsidiary-conspiracy" doctrine of
antitrust law to unincorporated divisions, the judge wrote:
We, as judges and lawyers, should not be restricted by the semantics chosen to
describe a particular factual situation. Historically and legally a corporation
has been deemed a person - and normally so personified as if a man, a creature
with but one brain, one medium of thought and action .... But are all corpora-
tions, in fact, "persons", each with one brain, one nerve center, at which all
decisions are reached? It is well settled that in corporate structures which con-
sist of a parent corporation and incorporated subsidiaries, each entity is capable
of conspiring. There, we have no difficulty in envisioning separate and in-
dependent conspirators .... The question, then, is what, if any, magic occurs
when the paper partition is removed. Is a business group which chooses to
organize as a single corporation with unincorporated divisions automatically
cast in the form of a normal person? Or may we have a corporate "person" in
the form of a multi-headed Siva, or as portrayed by Dali or Artzybasheff?
id. at 919. Perhaps worse was Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58
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The boundaries of the corporation are seldom set by analysis, but are
established by personification and precedent. 193 The realists may have
succeeded in reducing the corporation to a bundle of sticks, 94 but the
shape of the bundle is that of the old devil, corporate personality.
The corporation's nominalist personification has proven so vigorous
that not even realists are immune. There are at least two reasons for this.
First, a satisfactory non-legal theory of the corporate entity has not yet
been developed. Second, the contextual response demanded by realists to
the problem of corporate personality may not permit predictable rules of
commercial and corporate law. Perhaps a corporate personality with
rare inexplicable gaps is better than a fact-specific and sophisticated in-
quiry into each case,195 especially when the criteria for such an inquiry
are highly debatable.
Although the personification of the corporation may have caused more
overall good than harm, it has prevented serious consideration of the
wholly owned subsidiary corporation as totally distinct from the publicly
held corporation. These two devices, so different under economic analy-
sis, have received similar legal treatment. This personification myth ex-
tends beyond coupling limited liability with juridical personality. It is
also responsible for the myth of subsidiary independence. To be "real,"
subsidiaries must somehow be independent of the parent, much as the
parent corporation, to be "real," must be more than the alter ego of a
stockholder. The myth of subsidiary independence reached its high-
water mark in antitrust jurisprudence. For example, the ultra-formalistic
notion of inter-enterprise conspiracy among affiliates has only recently
(1926). Immediately after articulating the realist sentiment with which I began this Arti-
cle, Judge Cardozo ruled-in an amazing non sequitur-that the court had to respect the
corporate veil because piercing it would imply criminal behavior by the defendant. See
id. at 94-95, 155 N.E. at 61. Legal scholars have behaved in a similar, if less exaggerated
fashion. See, eg., Douglas & Shanks, supra note 14, at 198-99 (realist introduction, fol-
lowed by uncritical mass of case law). Certainly, many realist manifestos on corporate
personality were actually accompanied by real realism. See, e.g., Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co. v. Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 114-19, 222 N.Y.S. 532, 538-44 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (Bijur, J.)
(deconstructing corporate personality); T. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism 185-206
(1937) (personification of corporation and related symbolism created bizarre legal rights,
resulting in unrealistic economic policies).
193. Before Landers initiated the contemporary microeconomic debate with his 1975
article, the best analytic attempt to delineate the corporation was perhaps the "enterprise
theory" first propounded by Berle and more recently by Blumberg. See P. Blumberg,
supra note 48, at 23-25; Berle, supra note 27, at 344; Landers, supra note 11, at 591-92.
Although correctly recognizing the weak foundations of the subsidiary doctrine, the en-
terprise theory suffers from fuzzy goals and-depending as it does on distinguishing ac-
tive and passive parental roles-leads itself to excessive contextuality. See supra notes
155-61 and accompanying text.
194. Cf Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J.
655, 657 (1926) (criticizing influence of non-legal approaches to the corporate entity).
195. There is no question that such inquiries can be made, and even successfully made.
See Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1341 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)




been interred in the Copperweld case.1 96
The subsidiary's independence must be predicated on lack of control
by the parent. Consequently, the notion of "control" has always had a
mystical importance in the law of subsidiaries. 197 Indeed, the tort liabil-
ity of corporate parents for the actions of their subsidiaries is predicated
on excessive control by the parent. 98 Courts may obtain jurisdiction
over a foreign parent because the parent controls the subsidiary. I" With
the exception of the Copperweld case and subsequent antitrust jurispru-
dence, judges have avoided the obvious fact that parents usually control
their subsidiaries to the extent that it is efficient to do so.Y'
The unity of control has conjured up a unity of legal personality. In
order to maintain the fiction that subsidiaries have separate legal person-
ality, courts frequently resort to the fiction that subsidiary corporations
are separately controlled. Hence, it becomes essential for subsidiary cor-
porations to observe corporate formalities punctiliously. This require-
ment may account for the fragility of the separate entity doctrine in
banking, in which control of the branches by the head office has always
been acknowledged."I
It is amazing that the unrealistic subsidiary doctrine has survived this
long. While the corporation may indeed remain a nominalist construct,
it is a surprisingly functional legal institution. The corporation has
evolved over time. Most of the evolution has been quite functional even
though some of it has been inadvertent.' 02 Apparently, as long as an
196. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 759 (1984).
The high-water mark of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine had been reached when a
district court held that unincorporated divisions could conspire among themselves. See
Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915, 919
(D. Haw. 1967), rev'd, 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
The intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine may have been resurrected as a matter of state
law. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 493 So. 2d 1149,
1156-57 (La. 1986) (resurrecting Kiefer-Stewart line of cases for purpose of Louisiana
state antitrust statute).
197. See 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 43 (1990). One
of the clearest statements of the role of control in subsidiary veil-piercing was made by
Judge Hand: 'The test is therefore rather in the form than in the substance of the control
...." Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir.
1929). To this statement, one can only ask: why?
198. This makes some economic sense. See supra text accompanying note 44. The
degree of control required by the decided cases, however, is far beyond the modest degree
of control that would be rationally required to impute liability from control. See. e-g.,
Weisser v. Mursam Shoe Corp., 127 F.2d 344, 348-49 (2d Cir. 1942) (parent liable where
it represents to third parties that it is responsible for subsidiary's liability); Luckenbach v.
W. R. Grace & Co., 267 F. 676, 681 (4th Cir.) (separate companies treated as one unit in
breach of contract action where one officer owned 94% of one company, 90% of other
and exercised operating control over both), cert denied, 254 U.S. 644 (1920).
199. See Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1333-34
(E.D.N.Y. 1981).
200. This point was also noted by Wellborn, supra note 141, at 685-86.
201. See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965); First Nat'l
City Bank v. I.R.S., 271 F.2d 616, 618-19 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960).
202. For example, abolition of the notion of a corporation as a limited-life, limited-
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aspect of corporate law works tolerably well, nominalist mumbo-jumbo
will suffice and close analysis is unnecessary and even discouraged.3
The subsidiary doctrine has worked fairly well. One of its compo-
nents, juridical separateness, is welfare-enhancing. The other compo-
nent, limited liability, causes limited social harm. The internalized
harms that limited liability inflicts on contracting parties can be tolerably
minimized, except within the banking industry. The externalized harms
have been easy to neglect. An unpredictable veil-piercing law has always
been available to salve the shocked conscience and, in any case, the vast
majority of personal injuries do not lead the entity that inflicted the in-
jury to insolvency. Because courts cannot disperse the analytic haze of
corporate law and perceive any difference between wholly owned subsidi-
aries and other corporate forms, they feel justified in preserving the cor-
porate veil in the case of subsidiaries. While not causing too much harm,
the subsidiary confers one great benefit: a powerful conflicts device.
This benefit has been extensively and consciously used in regulatory mat-
ters, but may be insufficiently employed in domestic contract or tort
law. 2o4
C. The Subsidiary As an Institution
This Article argues that the subsidiary should be strengthened as a
jurisdictional doctrine and eliminated as a risk-shifting doctrine. Curi-
ously, the case law seems to be moving in the opposite direction. The
subsidiary is apparently holding its own as a risk-shifting doctrine and, in
many states, being increasingly weakened as a jurisdictional doctrine.20 5
This trend may be attributable to institutional factors.
The vitality of limited subsidiary liability in contract is easy to explain
purpose entity did not occur because some policymaker realized that unlimited corpora-
tions were economically superior. Rather, it occurred because of the political corruption
displayed by legislatures in granting corporate charters, as well as a race to the bottom
among states. See generally Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549-64 (1933)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (history of corporate evolution).
203. See, e.g., Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory,
88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 175 (1985) ("[A) 'natural entity' theory of the corporation was a
major force in legitimating big business . . ").
204. It is possible to argue that the subsidiary is already being optimally employed as a
conflicts device, except in the banking industry. Subsidiary compartmentalization has a
cost. Part of this cost is inherently unavoidable, such as the need to compartmentalize
activities to avoid veil-piercing. Part of this cost may be more contingent (such as possi-
ble tax benefits from unitary operations), but is nonetheless real. If state laws are suffi-
ciently similar, interstate subsidiary compartmentalization is not particularly desirable,
whereas international compartmentalization remains sensible. Given the current weak-
ened state of the Cannon doctrine, however, interstate compartmentalization of personal-
ity may make little sense.
In any event, fifty-state compartmentalization of personality is probably unnecessary.
The subsidiary is still useful in segregating comparatively few states with aberrant laws,
such as Mississippi (permissive statute of limitations) or Texas (no forum non conveniens
in state courts). If this is true, the Cannon juridical veil may well require strengthening.
205. See supra note 147.
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if one believes that common-law legal reform occurs in an evolutionary
manner. An inefficient law that is easily avoided is unlikely to change
through evolutionary processes because the somewhat preferable end re-
sult of legal reform is not justified by the intermediate period of uncer-
tainty that evolution engenders. Limited liability in contract might be
metastable. The same argument is somewhat harder to make in tort but
is still plausible. Perhaps veil-piercing jurisprudence, inarticulate as it is,
is preferable to a transitional period of legal uncertainty.
But this rationale does not explain the general erosion of the Cannon
doctrine. Another institutional explanation is necessary. Consider the
Bulova Watch case, discussed above as an exemplary application of the
enterprise theory.' Judge Weinstein joined the Japanese parent com-
pany because the Japanese company's United States subsidiary (which
inflicted damage in the United States) was a shell corporation and thus
judgment-proof. This result is almost the same as that which would have
been reached by the Cannon doctrine coupled with unlimited interaf-
filiate liability.2"7 In order to achieve the correct result, Judge Weinstein
had to pierce either the liability veil or the jurisdictional veil. If piercing
the limited liability veil would have caused greater doctrinal disruption,
then Judge Weinstein may have been correct in piercing the jurisdictional
veil. The lesson of Bulova Watch is that strengthening the limited liabil-
ity veil, at least in tort, will place greater strains on the jurisdictional veil.
Paradoxically, limited liability may be eroding the Cannon doctrine.
206. See supra notes 135, 161.
207. Cannon, coupled with unlimited liability, would only have made a difference if the
plaintiff had desired to litigate in Japan. The Cannon approach would bar such forum
shopping; Judge Weinstein's approach would not.
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